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Chapter 1 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
Introduction 
This dissertation explores the relationship between neighborhood social capital and 
crime through multiple empirical data analyses. In this dissertation, the links between social 
capital and crime are investigated using several approaches to the modifiable areal unit problem 
(MAUP) that extend beyond the traditional multilevel model that has been used in recent 
neighborhood studies. In addition, the issue of reverse causality is examined through an analysis 
of the effects of neighborhood crime and the crime prevention community design (bouhan 
machizukuri in Japanese) on residents’ social capital, including social ties, social participation, 
social cohesion, and social trust. Through these explorations, this dissertation provides new 
insights into an increasingly comprehensive understanding of the association between social 
capital and crime/crime prevention in Japan. 
Two main research approaches have been used in the field of criminal research. The first 
approach is the “etiology of crime,” which has been widely studied since the 1970s. This approach 
focuses on criminals’ internal factors, such as biology, mental illness, personality and 
posttraumatic states, as possible answers to the question of why people become criminals, and it 
seeks to prevent crime by addressing these factors (Blackburn, 1968; Conrad & Dinitz, 1977; 
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Eysenck, 1964; Lombroso-Ferrero, 1972; Moyer, 1971). Efforts to reduce crime based on the 
etiology of crime have been unsuccessful, however, because of the difficulty of identifying the 
causes of crime and developing rehabilitation programs that can counter or neutralize the 
influences of these causes on criminals or delinquent juveniles. 
The second approach, which has become increasingly accepted since the 1980s, is the 
“occasionalism of crime.” This approach assumes that there is little difference between criminals 
and non-criminals, as people with a low affinity for crime will commit crimes if they have the 
opportunity to do so, and people with a high affinity for crime will not necessarily commit a crime 
if they do not have the opportunity. This approach seeks to prevent crime by designing physical 
and social environments that make crime less feasible. This dissertation views crime from the 
occasionalism perspective and investigates the relationships between neighborhood community 
environments – especially neighborhood social capital – and crime. 
 
Background and Measurements of Social Capital 
Over the last decade, researchers have explored the effect of social capital as a 
community-level factor in crime prevention. According to Putnam (1995), social capital consists 
of “features of social organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate 
coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” (1995: 67). Close network ties within a group 
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generate higher levels of trust and give rise to norms of reciprocity. Trust and reciprocity, in turn, 
encourage cooperative behaviors – manifested as collective efficacy and informal social control 
– that have been hypothesized to yield many positive benefits (Healy & Cote, 2001; Putnam, 
2000). In “Making Democracy Work,” Putnam (1993) explained differences between subnational 
government performances in northern and southern Italy using the concepts of social capital. 
From his two-decade-long investigations of 20 Italian provincial governments’ performances, 
Putnam found that the northern provinces achieved a higher level of government performance 
compared with the southern provinces. He measured the rates of voting in national elections, the 
subscription rates for newspapers, the number of social organizations and other factors at the 
province level and concluded that the values of these indices were associated with the differences 
in province-level government performances. In southern Italy, where vertical social networks (i.e., 
social ties characterized by disparity in members’ power) were dominant, people’s social trust 
was low; regulations, a sense of helplessness, and alienation prevailed; political institutions were 
inefficient; and corruption flourished. However, in northern Italy, where horizontal social 
networks (i.e., social ties characterized by members’ homogenous social backgrounds) dominated, 
people’s social trust was high; values of solidarity and integration took root; people actively 
participated in organizations; and effective political institutions existed. Additionally, Putnam 
argued that affluent social capital causes people to voluntarily cooperate and trust each other. 
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Consequently, social capital may be a solution to the dilemma of collective actions and a key to 
making democracy work. Because Putnam devoted one-quarter of the book to describing the 
historical development of Italian culture, many readers thought that his theories could only be 
applied to Italy (Inaba, 2013). However, when Putnam (2000) applied the same theories to the 
U.S. context, researchers understood that he had explicated more universal theories. For example, 
Putnam found that the state-level integrated social capital index (which was composed of people’s 
participation in community volunteer activities, informal sociability, and social trust) and the 
state-level homicide rate had a near-perfect correlation (r = .80). However, even after Putnam’s 
application of social capital theory to the U.S. succeeded, some researchers were concerned that 
strong American characteristics such as racial/ethnic diversity would skew the results of his 
analyses (Inaba, 2013). 
Putnam’s “communitarian” definition is widely used as a categorization of social groups 
and citizen participation – i.e., bonding and bridging social capital. Bonding social capital 
indicates a homogenous relationship among community members and is a generator of trust, 
cooperation, and cohesiveness within the relationship (e.g., within family, ethnic, or racial groups). 
By contrast, bridging social capital connects heterogeneous people who belong to different 
groups/organizations (e.g., through relationships between different ethnic groups or 
heterogeneous social ties, such as with friends of friends). Bridging social capital conceptually 
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overlaps with Granovetter’s (1973) weak ties, and bonding social capital overlaps with strong ties. 
Putnam viewed social capital from the communitarian perspective and emphasized the 
importance of citizens’ participation in bridging groups/organizations. These views are contrasted 
with Bourdieu’s view that benefits are generated within individuals’ social ties and that these 
social ties are the outcomes of individuals’ personal backgrounds. 
The major reason that social capital exerts favorable effects on society is that it promotes 
cooperative behaviors. Additionally, social capital contributes to health, education, and the 
economy through various mechanisms, such as providing specific supports that reduce 
psychological stress (Kawachi, & Berkman, 2000), expanding children’s opportunities for 
learning experiences by expanding and diversifying their social connections (Croll, 2004; Pribesh 
& Downey, 1999), and enhancing market effectiveness by reducing the transaction cost through 
social trust (Miyagawa & Omori, 2004). Furthermore, Putnam claimed that social capital can even 
benefit people who do not contribute to creating and maintaining this capital in their neighborhood. 
In contrast to Putnam, Bourdieu (1986) defined social capital as “the aggregate for the 
actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less 
institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition” (1986: 248). Additionally, 
Coleman, a famous sociologist in the U.S., stated that social capital “consists of some aspect of a 
social structure, and it facilitates certain actions of individuals who are within the structure” 
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(1994: 302). Coleman posited that engaging in successful cooperative behaviors with others 
generates social trust and that these interactions encourage subsequent cooperative behaviors and 
can be a source of various benefits. Of particular note is that Putnam viewed social capital as a 
public good that contributes to collective gains among people who are embedded in local 
communities or groups, whereas Bourdieu and Coleman viewed social capital as a private good 
that contributes to private gains. 
The current dissertation defines social capital as a public good that influences 
neighborhood residents’ crime victimization because the problems of the social dilemma and the 
modifiable areal unit, which stem from crime prevention through neighborhood social capital, are 
intimately related to the collective goods features of social capital. In addition, Bourdieu argued 
that differences in social capital can be attributed to individual-level differences in socioeconomic 
backgrounds, whereas Putnam demonstrated that differences in social capital depend on the 
geographic place level. Although both perspectives are helpful in explaining the amount of social 
capital and its social consequences for each analytic unit (i.e., the individual and neighborhood 
levels), this dissertation notes that Putnam’s framework, which targets the neighborhood 
community, has an advantage for town development and policy recommendations. That is, for the 
purpose of shaping evidence-based political interventions in the field of crime prevention, the 
detection of vulnerable neighborhoods in terms of social capital is more efficient than the 
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detection of vulnerable individuals. Thus, this dissertation views social capital as a neighborhood 
feature that consists of networks, trust and norm reciprocity, according to Putnam’s definition. 
How, then, has social capital been operationally defined? In other words, how has it 
been measured? Because research on social capital from the aspect of private goods, represented 
by Bourdieu’s definition, has been developed from social network studies, many researchers have 
measured social capital from the structural perspective. Based on the assumption that social 
capital comprises resources that individuals can access through their social ties, researchers have 
measured people’s social networks mainly through the position generator and the name generator. 
The position generator aims to measure individuals’ capacity to access other people who hold 
valuable social positions. Participants are presented with a list of diverse occupations and asked 
whether they have acquaintances with the listed occupation (Lin, 2001). Individuals who have 
acquaintances with high occupational statuses, such as lawyers, doctors, and politicians, are 
regarded as having “high social capital.” Using the name generator method, participants are asked 
to list others with whom they conduct social exchanges (e.g., counseling and support) and to 
provide information about the listed people (e.g., their demographic characteristics, psychosocial 
characteristics and relationship with the participant) (van der Gaag & Webber, 2008). This two-
step measurement method captures the participants’ network structures and the characteristics of 
their relationships. The position generator and name generator techniques measure individual 
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social capital, and the measured network indices have been used mainly as explanatory variables 
to predict individuals’ success in business. Thus, to measure neighborhood-level social capital, 
other methods should be used. Operational definitions of social capital that are based on methods 
that are derived from social network analysis have been met with the criticism that such 
definitions are identical to the concept of individual-level social support (Moore, Salsberg, & 
Leroux, 2013). 
How, then, has neighborhood-level social capital been operationally defined for 
measurement purposes? For the social network components, the number and closeness (e.g., 
frequency of interaction) of social ties, such as family, friends and coworkers living in the 
neighborhood, are measured as structural aspects of neighborhood social capital (Harpham, 2008). 
In addition, the residents’ participation in various community organizations (e.g., political, 
educational, business, religious, sport, and hobby groups) is also often measured. Participation in 
community organizations can function as a brokerage that generates connections with others 
(social ties) and connections with other organizations (organizational ties). Furthermore, it can 
yield opportunities/norms for cooperative activities and access to various information and 
services. In the context of neighborhood research, network measurements aim to detect the effect 
of individuals’ embeddedness in organizations (Small, 2008). Trusting relationships enable the 
truster to benefit from the trustee’s resources by promoting cooperation and interactions between 
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the two parties. This prediction is based on theories that have arisen from the prisoner’s dilemma 
game, the N-person prisoners’ dilemma game, and the social dilemma (Anderson & Mellor, 2008). 
To tap into generalized trust in strangers, the following question in the General Social Survey, the 
European Social Survey and the World Values Survey has been often used: “Generally speaking, 
would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with 
people?” Recently, in place of trust in generalized others, trust in particularized others has become 
the predominant measure of trust. For example, the Social Capital Assessment Tool (Harpham, 
Grant, & Thomas, 2002) measures trust in neighbors by asking respondents whether they agree 
that “people in this neighborhood can be trusted.” Nevertheless, in the present dissertation, a 
subset of Yamagishi and Yamagishi’s (1994) generalized trust scale is used as the measure of trust. 
The norm of reciprocity refers to a willingness to help others with an expectation that others will 
reciprocate as needed. If general others, rather than the particular others whom an individual has 
directly helped, are assumed to be the reciprocator, the norm is referred to as generalized 
reciprocity. By contrast, if one expects direct reciprocation from the particular others whom one 
has helped in the past, the norm is referred to as particularized reciprocity. Generalized reciprocity 
is the measure of reciprocity that is used in this dissertation. The Adapted Social Cohesion and 
Trust Scale measures the norm of reciprocity by asking respondents whether “in general, people 
around here are willing to help each other out.” The scale also includes an item that focuses on a 
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behavioral aspect, as follows: “In the past six months, how often have you helped neighbors?” 
This dissertation uses the respondents’ own norms of generalized reciprocity (e.g., “If someone 
helps you, you would also help any other person”) and their aggregation at the neighborhood level. 
Table 1-1 indicates the social capital indices of the structural and cognitive aspects at each 
measurement level, i.e., the individual and collective (neighborhood) levels. Additionally, Table 
1-2 shows the question items that are related to neighborhood-level social capital indices. 
 
Table 1-1. Social capital indices of structural and cognitive aspects at each measurement level 
 
 
Measurement level Structural aspect Cognitive aspect
Name generator
Position generator
The number of and closeness of
social ties
Trust in others
The number and frequency of social
participation
Norms of reciprocity
Individual level
Collective (neighborhood) level
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Table 1-2. Tangible question items about neighborhood-level social capital indices 
 
 
Social Capital and Crime 
Within the field of criminal sociology, as Putnam discussed, social capital has been 
treated as a collective force that serves to prevent the occurrence of delinquency and crime in 
communities. For example, in Jacobs’s (1961) “The Death and Life of Great American Cities,” 
social capital was characterized as interpersonal relationships within neighborhoods that develop 
over long periods of time and serve to reduce the community’s rates of crime and delinquency via 
constant surveillance by residents (or what has been termed “eyes on the street”). More recently, 
Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls (1997) empirically examined the influence of collective efficacy 
(a summary measure of social cohesion, trust and informal social control) on crime in Chicago 
Question items Representative survey
The number of social ties (kin [or family],
friends, coworkers, etc.)
The number of neighborhood
groups/organizations the respondent
participates in and the frequency of
participation
"Generally speaking, would you say that
most people can be trusted or that you
need to be very careful in dealing with
people?"
General Social Survey, European Social
Survey, the World Value Survey
"People in this neighborhood can be
trusted"
Social Capital Assessment Tool
"Most people can be trusted" Yamagishi & Yamagishi (1994)
"In general, people around here are willing
to help each other out"
Adapted Social Cohesion and Trust
Scale
"In the past six months, how often have
you helped neighbors?"
Adapted Social Cohesion and Trust
Scale
"If someone helps you, you would also
help any other person"
Network
Trust
Norms of reciprocity
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using data from the Project on Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods. They classified 
Chicago neighborhoods into 343 neighborhood clusters and found that a neighborhood cluster’s 
collective efficacy (i.e., an aggregated variable at the neighborhood level) was negatively 
associated with the respondents’ reported perceptions of neighborhood violence, the respondents’ 
rates of violent victimization and the neighborhoods’ homicide rates. In other research, Kennedy, 
Kawachi, Prothrow-Stith, Lochner, and Gupta (1998) reported that aggregated generalized trust 
and civic participation were associated with lower gun violence at the U.S. state level. Rosenfeld, 
Baumer, and Messner (2001) found a negative association between an index of social capital (a 
summary measure of trust, fairness, helpfulness and civic engagement among neighbors) and the 
homicide rate at the U.S. county level. Even in country-level comparisons, the crime reduction 
effect of social capital has been found. Lederman, Loayza, and Menendez (2002) used data from 
39 countries and showed that the homicide rate was lower in countries where people’s social trust 
was high.  
Additionally, some researchers have investigated the causal association between social 
capital and crime – that is, they have examined which causes the other. Rosenfeld et al. (2001) 
estimated a non-recursive model in which possible reciprocal effects between social capital and 
the homicide rate were examined using structural equation models. Lederman et al. (2002) 
examined the causal association using instrumental variables that were correlated with the 
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explanatory variable (i.e., the social capital indicators) but were not correlated with the regression 
residuals. Lederman et al. used regional dummy variables to group countries according to their 
geographical location or stage of development and the numbers of telephones per capita and 
radios per capita in the country as instrumental variables. The results of both studies showed that 
the direction of the effect in which “social capital reduces crime” was robust. Thus, a number of 
studies have consistently found that social capital has a preventive effect on crime, and the idea 
that neighborhoods that are affluent in social capital have lower crime rates than those with less 
social capital is shared by many researchers. 
 
The Logics of the Crime Reduction Effect of Social Capital 
Why, then, is neighborhood social capital linked to crime rates? This section discusses 
the question from several theoretical criminological perspectives. 
A recent theoretical extension of traditional social control theory, the systemic model of 
crime proposed by Bursik and Grasmick (1993), focuses on informal social controls administered 
by neighborhood residents and formal social controls administered by public institutions as social 
factors that contribute to crime prevention (Figure 1-1). Formal social controls are public goods 
and services allotted by public institutions that are located within or outside the neighborhood. In 
general, the public institution that is most relevant to crime prevention is the police. The systemic 
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model of crime assumes that communities’ abilities to access resources from public institutions is 
ensured by residents’ social ties, including social participation and trust. In other words, this 
theory suggests that neighborhoods that are affluent in social capital are able to gain access to 
public social controls (Rosenfeld et al., 2001). For instance, in local communities with abundant 
social capital, residents can utilize “resources” such as alerting the police to neighborhood 
problems and cooperating with the police in crime prevention. 
 
 
Figure 1-1. The basic systemic model of crime (adapted from Bursik & Grasmick, 1993) 
 
As an additional form of informal social control, Sampson et al. (1997) advocated for 
the concept of collective efficacy. Collective efficacy is a sense of community that is associated 
with residents’ willingness to intervene on behalf of the public. This idea has two subordinate 
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concepts. The first concept is “informal social control,” which is the perception of neighborhood 
residents’ willingness to intervene in the communities’ problems. The second concept is “social 
cohesion and trust.” In neighborhoods where residents’ trust is high, the sense that residents work 
cooperatively together is strong; this sense is associated with a low crime rate. The above two 
subordinate conceptions fit well with social capital theory, especially because social cohesion and 
trust are nearly synonymous with the network and social trust concepts in social capital theory. 
In summary, trust, social participation and social networks facilitate informal social 
controls, collective efficacy among neighbors and access to formal social control administered by 
public institutions and contribute to reducing crime in neighborhoods. 
In a second criminological theory that is related to social capital, Rosenfeld et al. (2001) 
discussed the negative link between social capital and crime from the perspective of anomie 
theory. Anomie theory defines a situation in which a harmonious relationship between a socially 
defined goal and people’s means to achieve the goal is fallen apart as “anomie” (Merton, 1938, 
1968). Although in many societies, many people share the goal of economic success, the 
opportunities to achieve such success are limited for some. Such people will lose sight of social 
norms and emotional sympathy for other people and then think only about the means of achieving 
their goals. Merton called this situation “innovation.” This situation weakens the social norms 
that control deviant behaviors. Therefore, in anomic environments where people lack a strong 
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sense of order, people behave egoistically and are willing to exploit others. Furthermore, social 
trust declines as crime and violence simultaneously intensify (Rosenfeld et al., 2001). Thus, 
anomie theory describes a covariant relationship among social capital, anomie and crime rather 
than a one-way effect of social capital on crime. 
Third, social capital stimulates neighborhood management activities, such as cleanup 
activities, and other cooperative behaviors that subsequently reduce neighbors’ crime 
victimization (Takagi, Tsuji, & Ikeda, 2010). Community management activities, such as cleanup 
activities (e.g., mowing lawns and filling trash cans), represent “signs of occupancy” (Cirel, Evans, 
McGillis, & Witcomb, 1977). Signs of occupancy express a sense that neighborhood residents 
pay attention to their community. This sense, in turn, has crime-reducing effects. This process is 
also related to the broken window theory (Wilson & Kelling, 1982), which states that criminal 
behavior is prevented in neighborhoods where residents attend to their community. In the context 
of social capital theory, it is thought that neighborhoods with abundant social capital engage in 
abundant management activities, which lead to a lower crime rate. 
Incidentally, the studies that are included in this dissertation measured the respondents’ 
neighborhood social capital and examined the crime prevention effects of social capital 
aggregated at the neighborhood level. In this context, there is no ground for believing that the 
social capital surrounding a respondent’s house affects the respondent’s likelihood of being a 
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crime victim in areas that are geographically distant from his/her house or neighborhood. For 
example, an individual’s neighborhood social capital may have no effect on his/her likelihood of 
being victimized by purse-snatching in front of a train station. Therefore, this dissertation explores 
the crime prevention effects of social capital by targeting burglary victimization as the main 
outcome, because we can determine the sites where burglaries occur. 
 
The Scope of Social Capital 
Social capital theory researchers have discussed the scope of social capital. As 
previously mentioned, there is agreement that social capital includes social networks (social 
participation), trust, and the norm of reciprocity when it is defined at ecological levels (Kawachi, 
Subramanian, Kim, 2008). Meanwhile, a sense of belonging, the comfort of the local community, 
and the quality/attractiveness of a neighborhood (e.g., as related to noise, graffiti, litter, and green 
space) are theoretically located in the intermediate point between social capital and outcomes; 
thus, they are viewed as separate from social capital. Although some previous studies have treated 
such intervening variables as social capital, these variables should be discriminated from social 
capital (Harpham, 2008). Similarly, although it is unclear whether the collective/cooperative 
behaviors that are addressed in this dissertation are a subset of social capital, they should be 
treated as outcomes of social capital because, on most occasions, collective/cooperative behaviors 
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can be exercised only when an adequate amount of social capital exists (Grootaert & Bastelaer, 
2002). Thus, the present dissertation views social networks, trust, and reciprocity as proxy indices 
of the neighborhood forces that facilitate collective actions. That is, the concept that is represented 
by the term “social capital theory” does not include neighborhood management activities and 
informal social controls, but it does represent the neighborhood mechanisms that facilitate 
residents’ cooperative behaviors. 
Some researchers take the critical view that introducing social capital to traditional 
criminological models to boost the above-mentioned informal/formal social controls and 
neighborhood management activities is a just translation of traditional theories. However, the 
application of social capital theory to the criminological models is useful because researchers can 
introduce a number of features to the models. The first such feature is the concept of people’s 
(intentional and unintentional) investments in neighborhood social capital. Forming social 
networks and trusting others are “investments” in the local community and involve some costs, 
regardless of the investor’s intent. That is, maintaining neighborhood social capital requires some 
effort (thus, social capital can be accumulated via people’s efforts). The second feature is the 
externality (the spillover effect) of social capital. Namely, neighborhood social capital exerts 
favorable effects, even on residents who do not invest in it (this aspect of social capital is partially 
examined in Studies 1 and 2). Third, social capital can be diverted to serve other purposes. For 
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example, a sporting club that is organized to promote participants’ health can be helpful when 
neighborhood safety worsens or when an earthquake occurs. Fourth, social capital theory 
incorporates the downsides of social ties and trust. Although the downside feature of social capital 
is not addressed in the current dissertation, a previous study demonstrated that newcomers’ mental 
health degenerates in neighborhoods where the longer-term residents exhibit high levels of trust 
in each other (Takagi et al., 2013). 
 
Research on Social Capital and Crime in Japan 
When studying the relationship between social capital and crime in Japan, the following 
five points can be particularized. First and most simply, there are few empirical studies on this 
topic using Japanese data. It is clear, however, that people have attempted to reduce crime by 
utilizing neighborhood social factors. For example, the word kizuna (bond), which has been a 
trendy expression since the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011, indicates that in their daily lives, 
Japanese people have embraced the idea that community social ties are important for society. 
However, when we rigorously measure indices of social trust/networks and crime victimization 
and investigate their association in Japan, it is difficult to find the obvious linkage. Thus, 
cumulative empirical research on the relationship between social capital and crime is required to 
practically incorporate social capital into crime prevention in the Japanese context. 
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Second, the importance of social capital increases as a bulwark against increasing 
vulnerability to the social problems (such as crime and health problems) related to the aging of 
society and other social disparities in Japan (Nishida, 2010). Unlike Japanese society, American 
society is characterized by marked heterogeneity in social economic status and race/ethnicity. In 
the U.S., individuals and groups are spatially allocated according to race, income, and occupations, 
and this “segregation” based on various social characteristics is an important factor that 
contributes to increases in crime (Logan & Messner, 1987). In a society that is composed of people 
with different social backgrounds, social capital has been significantly important for connecting 
people who are socially different (i.e., it serves as “bridging social capital,” Bellair, 2000). In 
Japan, compared with the U.S. and the U.K., there have been fewer findings regarding the effects 
of residents’ heterogeneity on crime based on their social characteristics and the modifying effect 
of social capital. Because social diversity, such as economic disparities, is continuing to increase 
in Japanese society (Otake, 2005), research on the effect of social capital on crime is important 
for future crime prevention in Japan. 
Third, the reason that social capital receives substantial attention from researchers is 
related to the demerits and the limitations of the “crime prevention community design” (bouhan 
machizukuri in Japanese) that has become increasingly popular in town development in recent 
years. For example, there have been attempts to change communities’ physical environments to 
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enhance crime deterrence. The academic theories that are the bases for current environmental 
criminology and town development include theories that concern environmental design, such as 
situational crime prevention (Clarke, 1995), defensible space (Newman, 1972), and Crime 
Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) (Crowe, 1991). Most of the “environments” 
that these theories address refer to the physical features of neighborhoods, residences, and the 
urban structure. These theories explain the importance of the “hardware” aspect of neighborhoods’ 
physical environments and pay relatively little attention to the “software” aspect, such as social 
relationships among residents. Town development that is excessively focused on deterring crime 
is unrealistic, however, because of the finite nature of municipalities’ budgets. In addition, town 
development that enforces the physical environment’s abilities to deter crime increase the closed 
nature and exclusiveness of communities and ultimately cause their “fortification” (Blakely & 
Snyder, 1999; Low, 2003). By contrast, crime prevention through social capital arises as a by-
product of social capital. People do not form their social networks for the purpose of crime 
prevention; however, if the by-products of people’s social networks can prevent crime, they are 
highly beneficial. This is one motivation to empirically study the crime prevention effects of 
social capital. 
Fourth, ongoing changes in Japanese society are also associated with the need for 
research on the crime prevention effects of social capital in the Japanese context. In Japanese 
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traditional rural society, social mobility and social uncertainty were lower than in the U.S. and the 
U.K., and bonding social capital was created by the residents’ “closed” social networks. In such 
societies, because mutual surveillance among residents worked and outsiders were easily 
identified, crime was prevented with relative ease. However, recent changes in local communities 
have required the development of urban-type crime prevention models. In urban social settings, 
bridging social capital is likely to be constructed based on social ties, social participation and 
(generalized) trust that are not derived from the traditional territorial connections. In such 
societies, where people’s mobility and diversity of social characteristics are high, there is a need 
to construct social capital as a lubricant to unite people who have different social backgrounds 
(Takagi & Kawachi, 2014). In Japan, social characteristics are expected to become increasingly 
diverse in the future. Therefore, the current dissertation’s findings about the relationship between 
social capital and crime will be important. 
Finally, if the crime prevention effects of neighborhood social capital are robust, we can 
expect a synergistic effect that allows surplus police forces to be reallocated to risky 
neighborhoods where neighborhood social capital is poor. Understanding the relationship 
between neighborhood social capital and crime can provide some useful tips for identifying 
vulnerable neighborhoods from the perspective of social capital and for creating interventions and 
policy recommendations for such neighborhoods. 
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The remainder of this dissertation consists of three chapters. Each chapter includes two 
empirical studies. Chapter 2 addresses crime prevention through collective neighborhood 
behaviors (Studies 1 and 2). Study 1 investigates the effect of social capital and neighborhood 
management activities on crime victimization. The key purpose of Study 1 is to examine whether 
the crime prevention effect of social capital can be applied to the Japanese context. In this study, 
neighborhood management activities (e.g., cleanup activities) that led to improved neighborhood 
environments were used as a proxy of “signs of occupancy.” Study 2 discusses the idea that the 
crime prevention effects of social capital and the cooperative behaviors suggested in Study 1 
include features of the social dilemma. Study 2 asks, “How is social capital associated with the 
social dilemma and the continuation of collective cooperative behaviors?” 
Studies 3 and 4 in Chapter 3 examine how crime prevention effects vary according to 
the geographic range of neighborhoods. These studies approached the modifiable areal unit 
problem noted in the field of multilevel neighborhood research by applying geographical 
information systems and spatial analytical techniques. Focusing on “space” rather than a “place,” 
these studies aim to provide theoretically and practically beneficial findings by detecting the 
“precise” neighborhood effects of social capital. 
Chapter 4 discusses the impacts of crime on society through two empirical studies. 
Study 5 investigates the associations between crime and social relationships from the perspective 
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of the “reaction to crime,” which is a key component of criminal research. Study 5 demonstrates 
that crime has an adverse effect on individuals’ social relationships and social participation. Study 
6 examines the effect of the “surveillance society,” one type of reaction to crime, on neighborhood 
social capital. This study demonstrated that enhanced social surveillance, which arose from the 
deterioration of public safety, had both positive and negative aspects. By shedding light on the 
impacts of surveillance on social capital, Study 6 reveals the merits and demerits of community 
designs that are based on crime prevention. 
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Chapter 2 CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH COLLECTIVE 
NEIGHBORHOOD ACTIONS 
 
Study 1: The Effects of Social Capital and Neighborhood Management Activities on Crime 
Victimization 
 
Introduction 
Study 1 used empirical data and multilevel models to investigate whether the preventive 
effect of social capital on crime that has been observed in the Western countries also applies to 
the Japanese context. Although there are few empirical studies on the relationship between social 
capital and crime in Japan, there have been some previous studies in the field. For example, 
Yamamura (2009) found that social capital indices, including the number of fire companies and 
ceremonial occasions at the prefecture level, were inversely associated with the crime rate. A 2003 
report from the Cabinet Office captured volunteer activities as a social capital index and showed 
that the crime rate was low in prefectures with a high rate of volunteers (Cabinet Office, 2003). 
Although some research, such as the above studies, has shown significant associations 
between social capital and crime using Japanese data, overall, empirical research in this field is 
lacking in Japan. In particular, there is little research that directly measures neighborhood 
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residents’ trust, reciprocity and networks and analyzes the effect of these indices on crime using 
the multilevel model, an analytical method that is commonly used in the fields of criminology, 
public health and social epidemiology. 
In recent empirical studies on neighborhood social capital, researchers have mainly used 
the multilevel model. The multilevel model is a statistical method that uses independent variables 
at multiple levels and estimates their effects on an individual-level outcome variable. More 
specifically, this method estimates how features of social contexts, such as counties, states and 
countries, affect the crime victimization of the people embedded in these contexts by controlling 
individual-level covariates. For example, we may estimate the effects of neighborhood-level 
social capital on crime by viewing aspects of social capital as factors that predict individual-level 
burglary victimization, along with the effects of individual-level independent variables such as 
sex, age, household income, and type of housing. In criminal research that focuses on both 
individual- and neighborhood-level independent variables as important explanatory factors for 
crime victimization, the multilevel model is a useful analytical tool. 
It is especially necessary to use a multilevel model to examine the spillover effect 
(Putnam, 2000) of social capital. Although a certain portion of individuals’ investments in 
collective social capital returns directly to those who made the investment, a portion of that 
investment also benefits those who do not invest in the collective social capital. For instance, in 
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neighborhoods where the crime rate is reduced through the efforts of a subset of residents, people 
who do not cooperate with or do not even acknowledge other neighbors can also enjoy the benefits 
of a “safe neighborhood.” Although such situations can create free-rider problems, we consider 
such outcomes to be positive manifestations of social capital because the people living in these 
neighborhoods can gain positive spillover effects from abundant stocks of social capital. 
A schematic representation of the analysis in Study 1 is shown in Figure 2-1. Study 1 
tested a path model in which neighborhood-level social capital stimulated community 
management activities, such as cleanup activities, and in which those management activities, in 
turn, reduced neighbors’ crime victimization. Community management activities, such as cleanup 
activities (e.g., mowing lawns and filling trash cans) and community gatherings, represent “signs 
of occupancy” (Cirel et al., 1977). Signs of occupancy express a sense that neighborhood residents 
are careful about their community, and this sense has crime-reducing effects. These effects are 
also related to the broken window theory (Wilson & Kelling, 1982), which states that criminal 
behavior is prevented in neighborhoods where residents attend to their community. In the context 
of social capital theory, it is assumed that neighborhoods that are affluent in social capital offer 
abundant community management activities. Therefore, we can predict that the crime rate is 
reduced in such neighborhoods. 
Given these effects, what is the most appropriate geographical scale on which to 
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examine the interactions among neighbors living in relatively “micro” neighborhoods? Because 
the number of neighborhood management activities near residents’ homes may vary among 
geographic areas that are smaller than municipalities or towns, analyses based on geographically 
small neighborhoods are desirable to detect the crime prevention effects of such activities. Thus, 
the present study used street blocks as the unit of analysis in multilevel models. The issues that 
are related to the areal unit are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3. 
 
 
Figure 2-1. Summary of the path analysis in Study 1 
 
Methods 
Data 
In 2006, study group investigators mailed a questionnaire survey to 1,000 residents of 
Itabashi Ward in Tokyo, Japan. The subjects were chosen form eligible voter rolls using two-stage 
random sampling. The response rate was 44.1%. 
Neighborhood-level
trust/networks
Individual-level
trust/networks
aggregate
Neighborhood-level
management activities
Individual-level
management activities
aggregate
Individual-level
crime victimization
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Itabashi Ward is one of the 23 wards of Tokyo. It had a population of 523,083 at the 
time of the 2005 population census. Itabashi Ward is a typical urban area, and the population 
density is 16,243/km2. This ward ranks 9th in population density among the 23 wards of Tokyo. 
This study sampled from both old town areas with high residential stability and new residential 
areas with high residential mobility. Consequently, these data accounted for variations in 
neighborhood characteristics. 
If the number of crimes in Itabashi Ward is excessively high, it should affect the patterns 
of residents’ cooperative behaviors. The crime rate for this ward is 5.0 per 1,000 people, and the 
ward ranks 10th in crime among Tokyo’s 23 wards. Thus, this ward is average in terms of public 
safety. Based on the above-mentioned characteristics of the study region, the results of this study 
can be regarded as a crime prevention model for typical urban areas and can be generalized to 
other urban areas to a certain degree. 
 
Measurements 
This study measured the following two types of crime victimization in the past five years 
as dependent variables: “burglary,” consisting of household burglary and car break-ins, and 
“vehicle theft,” consisting of car, motorbike and bicycle theft. In the analysis, the sums of the 
respondents’ experiences of each type of crime victimization were used. 
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The main independent variables were social capital and management activities. The 
social capital variables included two types of social network indices (supportive social ties and 
personal network size) and generalized trust. Supportive social ties in the neighborhood were 
measured by the participants’ responses to the following two items: “Number of acquaintances 
who cooperate with you” and “Number of acquaintances who go to neighborhood events or 
meetings with you.” In the analysis, the average of these two items was used. The size of the 
residents’ personal networks was measured using their responses to the following two items: 
“Number of acquaintances whom you greet upon meeting them on the street” and “Number of 
acquaintances with whom you talk casually.” In the analysis, the average of these two items was 
used. The supportive network and the personal network size were scale-free items. Because the 
distributions of this type of scale are power-low or lognormal (Barabási, 2002; Watts, 2003), these 
network items were translated into natural logarithms. 
Generalized trust was assessed using the following items derived from Yamagishi and 
Yamagishi’s (1994) generalized trust items: “Most people can be trusted,” “Most people are 
basically good and kind,” and “I basically trust other people.” The participants responded using a 
4-point Likert scale (1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Agree, 4 = Strongly agree). In the 
analysis, the average of these three items was used. 
Neighborhood management activity was measured by asking the respondents how often 
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they participated in the following activities: “Participation in neighborhood meetings and talking 
about neighborhood problems” and “Participation in cleanup activities in the neighborhood.” The 
participants responded using a 4-point Likert scale (1 = Never participate, 2 = Rarely participate, 
3 = Sometimes participate, 4 = Frequently participate). In the analysis, the average of these two 
items was used. 
The respondents’ sex, duration of residency, annual household income and educational 
background were included as sociodemographic covariates. 
 
Statistical analysis 
As previously mentioned, the outcome variable of the first model, management 
activities, was measured using a 4-point Likert scale; the outcome variable of the final model, 
experiences of crime victimization, was count data that summed each respondent’s crime 
victimization experience. Therefore, this study used a multilevel linear regression model to 
analyze the management activities and a multilevel Poisson regression model to analyze the crime 
victimization. The neighborhood-level unit was the street block (n = 58). The average number of 
respondents embedded in each street block was 6.2 (in the analyses of crime victimization, 
however, the number of respondents in each block was reduced to 3.8 because of missing values). 
The software used was HLM6. A two-level random-intercept and fixed-slope model was applied. 
32 
 
Results 
 Table 2-1 contains the descriptive statistics for this study. 
 
Table 2-1. Descriptive statistics of Study 1 
 
a The values of the social network indices shown in this table were not translated into the natural logarithm. 
 
There were approximately 15% more women than men among the respondents. The 
Items Mean SD Items %
Social networks
a Sex
Size of personal network 6.82 9.09 Male 42.1
Supportive social ties 3.33 10.55 Female 57.9
Generalized trust (4-point scale) (α=.663) Annual household income
"Most people can be trusted" 2.47 0.73 Unwaged 1.8
"Most people are basically good and kind" 2.83 0.75 Less than 1 million yen 1.6
"I basically trust in other people" 3.03 0.74 1-2 million yen 7.3
Mean 2.77 0.57 2-3 million yen 12.0
3-4 million yen 14.6
Management activities (4-point scale) (r  = .472) 4-6 million yen 18.1
6-8 million yen 13.4
8-10 million yen 7.9
10-15 million yen 8.1
15-20 million yen 4.3
Mean 2.40 0.83 More than 20 million yen 1.2
NA/DK 9.7
Duration of residency 28.91 15.98
Educational attainment
Junior high school 8.5
High school 36.5
Technical school 14.2
University 23.5
Graduate school 0.8
Other 1.6
NA/DK 5.1
Burglary victimization
Household burglary 5.8
Car break-in 9.8
Vehicle theft victimization
Car/bike theft 7.6
Bicycle theft 27.0
Tow-year college/higher professional
school
9.7
"Participation in neighborhood meetings
and talking about neibhorhood's problems"
2.55 1.01
"Participation in cleanup activities in
neighborhood"
2.24 1.02
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most common income category was “4-6 million yen.” Concerning educational background, high 
school education was the most common, accounting for approximately 4 out of 10 participants. 
The percentages of respondents who experienced crime victimization were 5.8% for household 
burglary, 9.8% for car break-in, 7.6% for car/bike theft, and 27.0% for bicycle theft. 
Table 2-2 shows the effects of neighborhood- and individual-level social capital on 
individual-level management activities. 
 
Table 2-2. Multilevel linear model estimates for management activities 
 
 
Dependent Variable:
Independent Variables
Individual-Level Variables
Intercept 0.02
Sex (male=1) -0.12
Duration of residency 0.01 *
Household income 0.04 **
Educational background -0.05
Personal network size 0.03
Supportive networks 0.38 ***
Generalized trust 0.19 *
Neighborhood-Level Variables
Personal network size 0.33 ***
Supportive network size 0.16
Generalized trust 0.31 †
Random Effect
Intercept 0.00
Level-1 n 359
Level-2 n 58
Management
activity
Coefficient
Variance
Component
Note: ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, †p<.10
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As shown in Table 2-2, individual-level support networks and generalized trust were 
positively associated with management activities. Similarly, neighborhood-level personal 
network size was positively related to management activities. 
Next, the variable “management activities” was included as an independent variable, 
and the coefficients for each type of crime victimization were estimated (Table 2-3). 
 
Table 2-3. Multilevel Poisson model estimates for crime victimization 
 
 
Table 2-3 shows that neighborhood-level management activity was inversely linked 
Dependent Variable:
Independent Variables
Individual-Level Variables
Intercept -5.88 *** -1.73
Sex (male=1) 0.34 0.14
Duration of residency 0.02 * 0.01
Household income 0.16 † -0.01
Educational background -0.12 0.10
Personal network size 0.64 *** 0.00
Supportive networks 0.10 0.04
Generalized trust 0.50 0.13
Management activity -0.50 0.20
Neighborhood-Level Variables
Management activity -2.42 *** -0.41
Random Effect
Intercept 0.03 0.15
Level-1 n 221 221
Level-2 n 58 58
Coefficient
Variance
Component
Note: ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, †p<.10
Burglary Vehicle theft
Coefficient
Variance
Component
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with burglary victimization but was not associated with vehicle theft. However, individual-level 
management activity was not significant for either type of victimization. Furthermore, individual-
level personal network size showed a significant positive association with burglary victimization. 
 
Discussion 
 This study first analyzed the association between social capital indices and 
neighborhood management activities using a multilevel linear model (Table 2-2). The results 
suggested that a larger individual-level supportive network was associated with frequent 
participation in management activities. This result demonstrates that having many supportive 
acquaintances provides opportunities and support for participating in neighborhood activities, 
which stimulates cooperative behavior. At the neighborhood level, however, the significant effect 
of supportive networks was not found. Because supportive networks tend to be formed within 
relatively close and friendly relationships, the extent of their influence may be limited, and their 
effect on those who lack these types of networks may be small. 
 Network size was positively associated with management activities at the neighborhood 
level. Thus, in neighborhoods where neighbors have large social networks, respondents can easily 
interact with other people even if their own networks are small. This finding suggests that this 
type of network exerts a spillover effect on neighbors and may be an important factor that allows 
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individuals who lack social ties to participate in their communities. By contrast, the size of 
individual-level networks was not associated with management activities, suggesting that 
networks of mere acquaintances can exercise influence only when the people within such 
networks are grouped at the contextual level. To uncover the reason why the differences between 
individual- and contextual-level effects arose, further investigation is required. 
Both individual- and neighborhood-level generalized trust was associated with the 
exercise of management activities (but the significance level of neighborhood trust was 10%). 
This suggests that the expectation that others will behave cooperatively is important for 
individuals who engage in cooperative behaviors with others. Wrightsman’s (1992) focus on trust 
as a factor in resolving the prisoner’s dilemma and the social dilemma provides one perspective 
through which to understand these results. Specifically, people do not choose a cooperative 
behavior when there is a possibility of being exploited by others; however, they willingly choose 
a cooperative behavior when there is trust or an expectation that they can make exchanges with 
others on a reciprocal basis. 
 Next, in terms of the relationships between neighborhood management activities and 
crime victimization, Table 2-3 shows that the effects of individual-level management activities on 
crime victimization were not significant for either burglary or vehicle theft. By contrast, 
neighborhood-level management activities were associated with burglary victimization but were 
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not related to vehicle theft victimization. The reason that management activities were not 
associated with vehicle theft victimization can be inferred as follows: whereas household burglary 
and car break-ins, which are included in the burglary category, are likely to take place at or near 
victims’ homes, vehicle theft is not tied to the residence and can also take place in public places, 
such as stations and streets. Thus, victimizations that occurred far from victims’ homes cannot be 
prevented by management activities that are aggregated at the victim’s block level. Because of 
the inconsistency between the definition of “neighborhood” in this study (i.e., a block) and the 
geographic range of victimization measured, this study cannot detect a significant preventive 
effect of management activities on vehicle theft victimization. These results suggest that 
management activities that are conducted in residential areas enhance crime prevention in the area 
but are not efficacious for crime that occurs outside of the neighborhood. Future studies should 
examine the locations where the victimizations occurred versus defining the appropriate 
geographical range of the “neighborhood.” 
 An additional point to note is that individual-level management activities were not 
associated with crime victimization. The crime prevention effect was only exerted when the 
management activities were aggregated at the neighborhood level. These results are consistent 
with one of the conditions of the social dilemma, i.e., the smallness of individual influence causes 
people to withhold cooperative behaviors (Umino, 2006). This situation is a potential invitation 
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to free-ride. The social dilemma characteristics that are inherent in neighborhood cooperative 
behaviors are explored in greater detail in Study 2. 
 Regarding the positive relationship between individual-level personal network size and 
burglary victimization, it is possible that a large number of weakly interacting acquaintances, such 
as those whom respondents only greet when they meet them on the street, may increase the social 
diversity of people’s social networks. People whose social ties are numerous and diverse are more 
likely to become a crime victim because of an increased number of opportunities to be involved 
in unsafe situations and social uncertainty (Kennedy & Silverman, 1985; Krannich et al., 1989). 
However, it has been shown that large neighborhood-level personal network size promotes 
management activities and indirectly contributes to burglary prevention. These results suggest 
that this type of network index may have both crime-stimulatory and crime-prevention effects 
depending on its level. 
 As a limitation of this study, a problematic aspect of multilevel models should be noted. 
For the neighborhood-level variables, this study used the averages of responses from participants 
living on the same street block. According to this method, two respondents who are next-door 
neighbors may be assigned to different “neighborhoods,” and their reciprocal influences might be 
ignored in the multilevel analyses. Thus, simply clustering residents according to street blocks or 
other administrative boundaries makes it difficult for studies to detect rigorous neighborhood 
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effects. The issues concerning areal units are discussed in detail in Chapter 3. Finally, the 
generalizability of the present study’s findings should be discussed. This study surveyed residents 
in Itabashi Ward, Tokyo. Thus, the models that were examined in this study should be interpreted 
as an urban crime prevention model. The 2006 crime rate in Itabashi Ward reported by Tokyo 
Metropolitan Police Department (5.0 per 1,000 people) was ranked 10th among Tokyo’s 23 wards 
(mean 7.9, range 4.0-35.5); therefore, Itabashi Ward’s crime rate is average compared with 
Tokyo’s other 22 wards. Thus, the results of the present study are representative of areas with an 
average crime rate rather than those with an anomalously high crime rate. From that standpoint, 
this study’s results can be viewed as a crime prevention model for average Japanese urban areas. 
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Study 2: The Effect of Social Capital on the Social Dilemma Inherent in Collective 
Anticrime Activities 
 
Introduction 
In Study 1, the effects of street block-level management activities on crime victimization 
were examined through multilevel models. The significant crime reduction effect of 
neighborhood-level management activities that was found in Study 1 indicates that social capital 
has a spillover effect on the people who are embedded in its contexts. This result can be viewed 
as an example of the public good aspect of social capital; however, this feature of social capital 
can be an incentive for non-cooperation because people’s own individual cooperative behaviors 
do not have a crime reduction effect, as Study 1 showed. Thus, we can consider that the features 
of the social dilemma exist in the context of crime prevention through neighborhood cooperative 
behaviors. Study 2 explores a mechanism that promotes cooperative neighborhood crime 
prevention behaviors through social capital from the perspective of the social dilemma. 
The present study focuses on anticrime activities as cooperative neighborhood behaviors. 
Anticrime activities (jishu bouhan katsudou in Japanese) have been promoted by the policies of 
the National Police Agency and local governments. In 2007, the number of groups conducting 
anticrime activities, such as neighborhood watches and volunteer patrols, was 15 times higher 
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than the number in 2003 (Sugata, Kato, & Koide, 2008). 
The factors that promote anticrime activities among neighborhood residents have been 
examined within the framework of social control theory. The systemic model of crime (Bursik & 
Grasmick, 1993) in particular focuses on both the informal social control exerted by neighborhood 
residents and the formal social control administered by public institutions as factors that prevent 
crime. The systemic model assumes that people’s social ties and trust facilitate effective 
socialization and the availability of public resources and that informal and formal social control 
are, therefore, exercised in the neighborhood. Sampson et al. (1997) showed that residential 
stability enhances neighborhoods’ collective efficacy, which is the concept involving informal 
social control. The anticrime activity that is addressed in this study is one form of informal social 
control. 
In Japan, however, “crime prevention fatigue” has been noted as a recent problematic 
phenomenon in collective anticrime activities (Shimada, 2008, 2009). When this fatigue occurs, 
even after residents begin conducting neighborhood anticrime activities, some people or groups 
drop out because of the burden of excessive effort. Residents’ surveys have shown that groups 
that abandoned their activities refer to decreased motivation, getting into a rut, and deficiency in 
neighbors’ cooperation as reasons for discontinuing their crime prevention activities (Harada, 
2009). 
42 
 
Although empirical studies on informal social control and collective efficacy have been 
accumulating in the field, the appearance of features of the social dilemma in collective anticrime 
activities has thus far been largely ignored. As mentioned above, in social capital theory, although 
the spillover effect (in which some residents’ cooperative behaviors contribute to the safety of 
those who do not cooperate) can be considered a positive effect of social capital, it can also be a 
source of the free-rider problem (Putnam, Leonardi, & Nanetti, 1993). The pathway by which 
trust/networks increase collective efficacy, which drives informal social controls, may not 
adequately explain the continuity of collective anticrime activities. Thus, the present study 
investigated the effect of social capital on anticrime activities from the viewpoint of the social 
dilemma. 
Dawes (1980) pointed to the following two definitions as conditions of the social 
dilemma. 
(1)      
(2)  
where  represents the utility of individuals who choose “deception” when  people in 
society choose “cooperation,” and  represents the utility of individuals who choose 
“cooperation” when  people in the society choose “cooperation.” Thus, equation 1 
indicates that deception is more desirable for individual actors than is cooperation (in other words, 
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actors gain lower utility when they choose cooperation than when they choose deception). One 
reason for the lower utility is the cost (i.e., time and energy) of cooperative behaviors. Equation 
2 shows that the situation in which all members of the society choose cooperative behavior is 
more desirable than the situation in which all members of the society choose deception, as the 
latter situation is the most socially inefficient. Thus, although deception is desirable for 
individuals, utility decreases considerably if all members of the society choose deception. Hence, 
a situation in which non-cooperation by all members of society decreases their utility but the cost 
of cooperation is high represents a social dilemma because people cannot choose either 
cooperative or non-cooperative behaviors. 
However, a situation that consists of only the two abovementioned conditions cannot be 
clearly distinguished from the prisoner’s dilemma game, in which only two actors exist. Because 
there are only two “players” in the prisoner’s dilemma game, one player’s choice directly and 
strongly affects the other player. However, for cooperative behaviors in local communities, the 
smallness of one’s behavioral impact given the presence of many other people can also be an 
important factor that inhibits cooperative behaviors. Thus, in addition to the above two definitions, 
Umino (2006) indicated that Dawes’s definitions cannot capture the “sense of inefficacy,” that is, 
the idea that the impact of any one individual is small in society as a whole. In the social dilemma 
situation, the impacts of individual’s choices are much smaller than in the prisoner’s dilemma. 
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The behavioral choice strategies that can be observed in the prisoner’s dilemma do not exist in 
the social dilemma situation because individuals’ choices have little influence on the situation. 
Therefore, the sense of inefficacy that results because the influence of individuals is quite small 
should be included in Dawes’s definition when the social dilemma is conceptualized in contrast 
to the prisoner’s dilemma. 
Drawing from the above three definitions, the social dilemma has the following three 
features: cooperative behaviors burden actors (sense of cost); if all members of society choose 
deception, the results are undesirable for society (sense of crisis); and the impact of individuals’ 
actions is quite small (sense of inefficacy). That is, the social dilemma situation suggests that one 
knows that society suffers in the absence of people’s cooperative behaviors, but one cannot choose 
either cooperation or non-cooperation because the cost and the small impact of individual 
behaviors serve as incentives for non-cooperation. The present study aimed to capture this 
situation using the three abovementioned indices. Incidentally, if an individual estimates that cost 
and inefficacy are high and the sense of crisis is low, he/she cannot regard the situation as a 
dilemma, and he/she can willingly choose non-cooperation because there is only incentive for 
non-cooperation. 
Given the above formulation of the social dilemma, this study examined the hypothesis 
that trust, reciprocity and social participation among actors (i.e., neighborhood residents) reduce 
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the cost of cooperation, allow the actors to share the same interests (an increase in the sense of 
crisis), and reduce the sense of inefficacy. This study used variables aggregated at the 
neighborhood level as social capital indices and analyzed the path model shown in Figure 2-2 
using multilevel models. The neighborhood-level unit is described in the Methods section. 
 
 
Figure 2-2. Schematic of the path analysis in Study 2 
 
Methods 
Data 
In 2009, study investigators mailed a questionnaire survey to 635 residents of Makuhari 
Bay Town in Chiba Prefecture, Japan. The response rate was 75.1%. Makuhari Bay Town is a 
large housing area that consists of 32 apartment buildings that are built on 84 hectares of land. 
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Residents began to move to the area in 1995, and as of March 2009, 22,900 people lived there in 
7,950 households. This survey is the third wave of a panel study (people who responded to both 
the first and the second wave of the surveys conducted in 2006 and 2007 were surveyed). 
This study considered apartment buildings rather than commonly used choumoku as the 
“neighborhood community.” The apartment buildings were treated as the neighborhood because 
they are more explicit autonomous boundaries than choumoku in large housing complexes such 
as Makuhari Bay Town, since autonomy is established for each apartment building. For example, 
bulletin board systems (BBS) and mailing lists exist at each apartment building, and the apartment 
buildings serve as “neighborhoods” for each resident. Since the beginnings of Makuhari Bay 
Town, its residents’ concern for town development has been high, and ambitious efforts have been 
exerted (the abovementioned community BBS and mailing lists are examples). Thus, by focusing 
on this area, neighborhood anticrime activities and the crime prevention fatigue and free-riding 
derived from them can be readily captured in the framework of multilevel models. 
 
Measurements 
The survey items that assessed social capital included items concerning generalized trust, 
norms of reciprocity, and social participation. Generalized trust was assessed with the following 
three items: “Most people can be trusted,” “Most people are basically good and kind” and “I 
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basically trust other people.” The responses were arranged on a 4-point Likert scale (1 = Strongly 
disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Agree, 4 = Strongly agree). The average of these three items was used. 
The norms of reciprocity were measured using the following three items: “In society, people 
follow the rule that they should help each other in a pinch,” “If someone helps you, you would 
also help any other person” and “If you are dealt with kindly by other people, you also feel that 
you would help someone in need.” These responses were also presented on a 4-point Likert scale 
(1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Agree, 4 = Strongly agree). In the analyses, the average 
of these three items was used. For social participation, the sum of the respondents’ participation 
in the following 14 neighborhood groups/activities was determined: residents’ associations, 
condominium management associations, parent-teacher associations, organizations for local 
children, disaster prevention activities, activities relevant to the neighborhood environment, 
support groups for the elderly and disabled, child-rearing support groups, Meals on Wheels, 
neighborhood events and festival planning groups, neighborhood newsletter groups, free 
market/joint purchase groups, sports clubs, and hobby groups. In the analyses, the first principal 
component score for generalized trust, norms of reciprocity and social participation was used as 
the social capital index. 
Sense of crisis, sense of inefficacy, and sense of cost variables were measured as 
cognitive components of the social dilemma situation according to Umino (2006). Umino (2006) 
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addressed the social dilemma situation relevant to trash separation in neighborhoods. Trash 
separation is also one of the collective cooperative behaviors that are conducted in neighborhood 
communities, and Umino’s methods can be applied to collective anticrime activities in 
neighborhoods. Each item was arranged on a 4-point Likert scale (1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = 
Disagree, 3 = Agree, 4 = Strongly agree). Sense of crisis was assessed using the following two 
items: “Community safety will deteriorate if neighborhood residents do not conduct anticrime 
activities in the neighborhood” and “The deterioration of public safety due to neighborhood 
disorder will not happen until far into the future (reverse scoring).” Sense of inefficacy was 
measured using the following two items: “Even if I conduct anticrime activities, my neighborhood 
will not become safer” and “If I participate in safety patrols and friendly greeting campaigns in 
my neighborhood, my neighborhood will become safer (reverse scoring).” Sense of cost was 
measured using the following two items: “Conducting anticrime activities with my neighbors is 
a troublesome task for me” and “Conducting anticrime activities with my neighbors takes up 
much of my energy.” The averages of each item were used as the cognitive components of each 
social dilemma indicator. The sociodemographic covariates included the respondents’ sex and age. 
The dependent variables were collective and individual anticrime activities. The index of 
collective anticrime activities was based on the frequency of the respondents’ participation in the 
following neighborhood activities (1 = Do not participate at all, 2 = Rarely participate, 3 = 
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Sometimes participate, 4 = Frequently participate): “Neighborhood crime watch,” “Friendly 
greeting campaigns at school roads” and “Neighborhood meetings on crime prevention.” In the 
analysis, the first principal component of these three items was used. 
For individual anticrime activities, the respondents were asked whether they engaged in 
the following seven behaviors: “Changing a lock on a door to prevent burglary,” “Installing a 
secondary window key in addition to a normal key,” “Caring about strange occurrences 
(suspicious figures and sounds) at neighbors’ houses,” “Avoiding walking alone at night,” 
“Carrying a portable crime prevention buzzer,” “Keeping a safe distance from passersby on the 
road at night” and “Being picked up by family or friends at night instead of walking home.” In 
the analysis, the first principal component score of these seven items was used. The principal 
component score was calculated using a tetrachoric correlation matrix because these seven items 
were binary. 
In addition to the cross-sectional participation in 2009, a variable that indicated the 
continuation of participation in neighborhood anticrime activities from the most recent past 
survey in 2007 to the present survey in 2009 was analyzed. In the analysis of this variable, the 
participants who responded to both the 2007 survey and the current survey were included. In this 
analysis, the people who reported that they participated in neighborhood anticrime activities in 
both 2007 and 2009 were coded as 1; all others were scored as 0. 
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Statistical analysis 
The macro-level unit was the condominium building (n = 32). The average number of 
respondents who were embedded in each condominium building was 14. Multilevel models were 
used; the individual level was level 1, and the condominium building level was level 2. The 
software used was HLM6. 
 
Results 
Table 2-4 shows the descriptive statistics of the present study’s sample. 
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Table 2-4. Descriptive statistics of Study 2 
 
Items Mean SD Items %
Collective anticrime behaviors (4-point scale) (α=.774) Sex
Neighborhood crime watch 1.34 0.691 Male 40.0
Female 60.0
Age
20-29 years old 2.7
30-39 years old 22.8
Individual anticrime behaviors (0-7) 1.80 1.299 40-49 years old 39.1
50-59 years old 18.0
Generalized trust (4-point scale) (α=.761) 60-69 years old 11.4
"Most people can be trusted" 2.50 0.709 70-79 years old 5.9
"Most people are basically good and kind" 2.66 0.615
"I basically trust other people" 2.93 0.634
Norms of reciprocity (4-point scale) (α=.488) Continually participated 7.1
Dropped out 12.4
Social participation (0-12) 3.08 2.850
Sense of crisis (4-point scale) (r  = .238)
Mean 2.76 0.645
Sense of inefficacy (4-point scale) (r  = .252)
Mean 2.62 0.654
Sense of cost (4-point scale) (r  = .636)
Mean 2.20 0.674
3.36 0.561
"Even if I conduct anticrime activities, my
neighborhood will not be safe"
2.56 0.895
"Conducting anticrime behaviors with my
neighbors takes up a lot of my energy"
2.20 0.780
"If someone helps you, you would also
help any other person"
"Conducting anticrime behaviors with my
neighbors is a troublesome task for me"
2.21 0.707
2.46 0.636
"Deterioration of public safety by
neighborhood disorder will not happen
until far into the future" (reverse scoring)
"If I participate in safety patrols and
friendly-greeting campaigns in
neighborhood, my neighborhood will be
safe" (reverse scoring)
2.69 0.755
Friendly-greeting campaigns at school
roads
1.50 0.863
Neighborhood meetings about crime-
prevention
1.41 0.757
"In society, people follow the rules in
which people should help each other in a
pinch"
Continuation of neighborhood anticrime
activities between 2007-2009
3.03 0.761
2.50 0.875
"If you are dealt with kindly by other
people, you also feel that you would help
someone in need"
3.54 0.516
"Community safety will deteriorate if
neighborhood residents do not conduct
anticrime activities"
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Table 2-4 shows that the frequency of participation in collective anticrime behavior was 
relatively low (1.34-1.50 on a 4-point scale). The individual anticrime behaviors variable was also 
low, on average (1.8 out of 7 behaviors). In terms of the continuity of collective anticrime 
activities from 2007 to 2009, only 7.1% of the respondents reported that they participated in 
anticrime activities in both survey years. In comparison, 12.4% of the respondents participated in 
collective anticrime activities in 2007 but discontinued these activities by 2009. 
The associations between the social capital index and the cognitive elements of the 
social dilemma are shown in Table 2-5. 
 
Table 2-5. The associations between social capital and each cognitive element of the social 
dilemma 
 
 
Dependent Variable:
Independent Variables
Individual-Level Variables
Intercept 3.14 *** 2.19 *** 2.73 ***
Sex (male=1) -0.03 -0.13 * 0.04
Age -0.04 0.07 * 0.02
Social capital index 0.16 *** -0.18 *** -0.13 **
Condominium Building-Level Variable
Social capital index 0.28 ** -0.60 ** -0.37 *
Random Effect
Intercept 0.00 0.02 ** 0.00
Social capital index 0.00 0.01 0.00
Level-1 n 462 462 462
Level-2 n 32 32 32
Variance
Component
Variance
Component
Variance
Component
Note: ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05
Sense of crisis
Sense of
inefficacy
Sense of cost
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
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Table 2-5 shows that individuals who had high social capital and those who lived in a 
building that was characterized by high neighborhood social capital were likely to estimate the 
disadvantage stemming from non-cooperation (i.e., the sense of crisis) to be high. Table 2-5 
demonstrates that both individual- and apartment building-level social capital reduced individuals’ 
inefficacy. Similarly, the table shows that individual- and building-level social capital reduced the 
perception of the cost of engaging in cooperative behavior with neighbors. These results 
suggested that social capital influences people’s cognition about resolving the social dilemma, 
regardless of the measurement level. 
Table 2-6 shows the association between the cognitive elements of the social dilemma 
and participation in anticrime activities. 
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Table 2-6. The association between the cognitive elements of the social dilemma and 
collective/individual anticrime activities 
 
 
First, both individual- and condominium-level social capital indices were positively 
associated with participation in collective anticrime activities but did not have significant effects 
on individual anticrime behaviors. Second, in terms of the social dilemma variables, the results 
showed that the sense of inefficacy and the sense of cost reduced participation in neighborhood 
Dependent Variables:
Independent Variables
Individual-Level Variables
Intercept -0.25 † 0.48 ***
Sex (male=1) -0.09 -0.33 ***
Age 0.08 * 0.01
Sense of crisis 0.01 0.07 **
Sense of inefficacy -0.16 ** 0.01
Sense of cost -0.13 * 0.04
Social capital index 0.28 *** -0.02
Condominium Building-Level Variables
Sense of crisis 0.07 0.06
Sense of inefficacy 0.07 0.04
Sense of cost 0.10 0.08
Social capital index 0.45 * -0.10
Random Effect
Intercept 0.00 0.00
Sense of crisis 0.04 * 0.00
Sense of inefficacy 0.07 0.00
Sense of cost 0.03 ** 0.01 †
Social capital index 0.03 * 0.00
Level-1 n 477 477
Level-2 n 32 32
Variance
Component
Variance
Component
Note: ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, †p<.10
Collective
anticrime activities
Individual
anticrime activities
Coefficient Coefficient
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collective anticrime activities. The sense of crisis was not linked to collective anticrime activities. 
Furthermore, individual anticrime behaviors were associated only with the sense of crisis. In 
comparison, no cognitive component of the social dilemma aggregated at the apartment building 
level was associated with the collective anticrime activities. 
Table 2-7 shows the effects of the social capital and social dilemma indices on the 
continuity of collective anticrime activities from 2007 to 2009. Because the outcome variable was 
binary, a multilevel logistic regression analysis was applied. 
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Table 2-7. The effects of the social capital and social dilemma indices on the continuity of 
collective anticrime activities 
 
 
In Table 2-7, both individual- and condominium-level social capital showed a 
significant positive association with the continuity of collective anticrime activities. In terms of 
the cognitive elements of the social dilemma, only the individual-level sense of cost had a 
significant association with the continuity of collective anticrime activities. 
Dependent Variable:
Independent Variables 95%CI
Individual-Level Variables
Intercept 0.05 *** (0.01-0.18)
Sex (male=1) 0.44 † (0.18-1.05)
Age 1.11 (0.80-1.54)
Sense of crisis 1.21 (0.75-1.94)
Sense of inefficacy 0.98 (0.65-1.58)
Sense of cost 0.56 * (0.34-0.92)
Social capital index 1.87 ** (1.31-2.67)
Condominium Building-Level Variables
Sense of crisis 0.78 (0.34-1.80)
Sense of inefficacy 0.74 (0.35-1.66)
Sense of cost 0.28 (0.06-1.46)
Social capital index 2.27 ** (1.80-2.78)
Random Effect
Intercept 0.11
Sense of crisis 0.30
Sense of inefficacy 0.19
Sense of cost 0.35
Social capital index 0.30
Level-1 n 442
Level-2 n 32
Continuity of participation
Odds Ratio
Variance
Component
Note: ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, †p<.10
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Discussion 
The present study shows that social capital encourages crime prevention activities 
through the cognitive resolution of the social dilemma. Both individual- and condominium-level 
social capital indices were positively associated with the sense of crisis (Table 2-5). This result 
suggests that abundant interactions among residents help to broaden their social views and may 
dissipate the differences between individual and collective interests. For example, Inamasu et al. 
(2010) suggested a concept of social perspective as a factor that explains the association between 
affluent social networks and frequent social participation. Social perspective is the ability to 
understand the existence of world views that differ from one’s own familiar living environment 
and to feel connections with society. Therefore, people who can take social perspective through 
abundant social capital are likely to experience not only their own fear of crime but also a critical 
feeling about the “deterioration of the neighborhood.” Additionally, frequent contact with others 
may help people identify the problems that the neighborhood faces. For example, if people do not 
have any acquaintances in the neighborhood, they are not likely to know the troubles that their 
neighbors face, whereas if they are acquainted with their neighbors, they become aware of the 
neighborhood’s current situation. Additionally, affluent social ties increase people’s opportunities 
to gain information about crime in the neighborhood and, consequently, heighten their fear of 
crime (Arai et al., 2013; Shimada et al., 2004). Furthermore, individuals’ sense of “my profits and 
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losses” changes into a sense of “our profits and losses” as their social ties in the neighborhood 
increase. De Filippis (2001) argued that for individuals embedded in informal social networks, 
individual gains and interests are likely to become synonymous with group gains and interests 
(and then they act as networks). This process can be interpreted from the perspective of the civic 
virtue model that Boix and Posner (1998) advocated as an explanation of the association between 
social capital and governance in neighborhood communities. That is, social capital shifts residents’ 
preference from individual interests to collective interests, developing the “I” into the “we.” Based 
on this viewpoint, in neighborhoods with rich social capital, people consider their neighborhood 
and express concern about the neighborhood’s safety (i.e., they develop a sense of crisis). 
In the current study, social capital was negatively associated with the sense of inefficacy 
(Table 2-5). That is, in communities where affluent social capital exists, people can expect that 
their cooperative behaviors are effective and relevant because they can anticipate others’ 
cooperation. 
Based on the negative association between social capital and the sense of cost (Table 2-
5), we can infer that social participation and trust among neighbors can reduce the sense of cost 
by increasing the ease with which people engage in cooperative behaviors. Additionally, the 
expectation that neighborhood residents are willing to cooperate may convince people who 
provide their resources to others that their behavior will not be unilaterally exploited. 
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Table 2-6 demonstrates that an individual-level sense of inefficacy and cost are related 
to collective anticrime activities, whereas a sense of crisis is not. These results suggest that to 
encourage collective anticrime activities, it is important to reduce the sense of inefficacy and cost 
but not to proclaim a social crisis. Conversely, the index of individual anticrime behaviors was 
only associated with a sense of crisis. Because individual anticrime behaviors do not require 
cooperation with neighbors, the sense of inefficacy and cost regarding neighborhood collective 
activities are not involved in people’s decision to engage in individual behaviors. 
Furthermore, the analysis of the continuity of collective anticrime activities using data 
from two panel time-points showed that only the sense of cost was significantly correlated with 
the continuity of participation (Table 2-7). That is, if the sense of cost is high, continuous 
participation is reduced. Although Table 2-6 shows that the sense of inefficacy can explain 
“temporary” participation in collective anticrime activities, Table 2-7 suggests that a reduction in 
costs is more important for continuous participation. Sampson et al. (1997) treated social control 
and collective efficacy as nearly identical concepts, whereas the present results suggest that 
efficacy explains the onset of social control but does not predict its continuity. The present results 
showed that only the sense of cost was linked to continuity, which is consistent with Shimada’s 
(2008, 2009) anecdotal evidence that collective anticrime activities are often interrupted by the 
“fatigue of crime prevention.” A pragmatic recommendation that stems from the present findings 
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is that to sustain participation in collective neighborhood anticrime activities, it is important to 
both reduce the sense of inefficacy and improve the environment so that participation costs are 
reduced. 
In summary, this study examined the association between the recognition of the social 
dilemma and participation in collective anticrime activities under the assumption that crime 
prevention efforts through neighborhood collective actions are associated with each cognitive 
component of the social dilemma. As expected, the results showed that each cognitive component 
of the social dilemma was related to a reduction in the tendency to participate in collective 
activities. The respondents who underestimated the efficiency of collective actions and 
overestimated their costs were also unlikely to participate in collective actions. Moreover, the 
sense of cost was associated with the continuity of collective behaviors. This study suggests that 
social capital helps to resolve people’s social dilemmas and that reducing the sense of cost is 
especially effective for sustaining neighborhood collective action. 
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Chapter 3 EXPLORATIONS USING GEOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION 
SYSTEMS AND SPATIAL ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUES 
 
Study 3: Variation of the Effects of Social Capital on Burglary According to Geographical 
Scales of the “Neighborhood”1 
 
Introduction 
Many studies, including those referred to in Chapters 1 and 2, have generated findings 
on the relationship between social capital and crime using multilevel models. In the research to 
date, the spatial scale that has been adopted at the macro-level has varied substantially and has 
included whole countries (Lederman et al., 2002), states (Kennedy et al., 1998), counties 
(Rosenfeld et al., 2001), town blocks (Takagi et al., 2010), schools (Lindström, 2001), and 
apartment buildings (Saegert & Winkel, 2004). 
Although an association between social capital and crime has consistently emerged 
across studies regardless of spatial scale, the artificiality of geographical boundaries continues to 
raise the specter of the MAUP. The MAUP states that the results of multilevel research may be 
                                                   
1 Study 3 is based on the author’s previous study which was published in a book titled “Global 
perspectives on social capital and health” (Takagi, D. [2013]. Neighborhood social capital and crime. 
In I. Kawachi, S. Takao, & S. V. Subramanian [Eds.], Global perspectives on social capital and 
health [pp. 143-166]. New York: Springer). 
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inconsistent across models that use different areal aggregations (Mobley, Kuo, & Andrews, 2008). 
Few multilevel studies have addressed this problem empirically in social psychology and 
criminology. In the fields of epidemiology and public health, it is common practice for researchers 
to operationally define multiple administrative boundaries and conduct multilevel analyses for 
each definition of “neighborhood” to test the MAUP. For instance, Mobley et al. (2008) 
investigated whether different definitions of areal aggregates affected the results of multilevel 
analyses using the following four areal units in California: the county (n = 57), the medical service 
study area (n = 519), the primary care service area (n = 333) and the U.S. Census zip code area 
(n = 1,450). The researchers examined the effects of contextual-level variables for each areal unit 
on mammography use among elderly women living in California. The results suggested that the 
effects of area-level variables (such as racial segregation, the proportion of elderly females living 
alone, and the proportion of elderly people in poverty) differed according to the areal unit of 
analysis. Tarkiainen, Martikainen, Laaksonen, and Leyland (2010) also examined the relationship 
between neighborhood characteristics, such as the proportion of manual workers in the area and 
mortality, using two alternative areal units in Finland (70 districts versus 258 subdistricts in 
Helsinki, Vantaa, Espoo, and Kauniainen). Although they found that the effects of neighborhood-
level characteristics on mortality were slightly stronger when smaller area units were used, they 
suggested that the choice of area scale did not significantly change the estimates for neighborhood 
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effects on mortality. 
Regardless of the size of the area unit, however, it is questionable whether the 
geographical ranges that are defined by administrative boundaries are appropriate units for 
defining “neighborhoods.” According to Morenoff, Sampson, and Raudenbush (2001), the 
problem of assigning boundaries in multilevel models is that “two families living across the street 
from one another may be arbitrarily assigned to live in different “neighborhoods” even though 
they share social ties” (2001: 522). For this reason, the use of administrative boundaries to define 
the contours of “neighborhood social capital” may result in the misclassification and 
misestimation of the contextual effects of social capital. Specifically, the administrative 
boundaries that are generally used as the unit of analysis, such as blocks, counties and states, may 
not be the best distinctions for testing the effects of social capital on crime. 
In the current study, aggregate-level spatial scales were defined using physical distances 
among residents rather than according to administrative boundaries. By defining various 
geographic sizes of neighborhoods and conducting multiple analyses, this study examined the 
variability in the effects of social capital on crime according to the spatial scales of the aggregate-
level units used in the analyses. 
An outline of the method is presented in Figure 3-1. First, the addresses of respondents 
were converted into coordinates and were plotted on an electronic map as point data using 
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geographical information systems software (ArcMap). After the conversion, each respondent’s 
social capital indices (measured via mail survey) and the spatial distances among the respondents 
became available. 
To define neighborhood-level units using the distances among respondents, this study 
manipulated the data as described below (Figure 3-1). For example, when the “neighborhood” 
was defined as the people living within 100 meters of each other, a circle around central 
respondent A was drawn, the other respondents in this circle (in this case, B, C and D) were 
defined as “A’s neighbors,” and the average of their social capital indices was used as an 
independent variable to explain A’s burglary victimization. The same processes were followed for 
all of the respondents. When the definition of “neighborhood” was extended to 150 meters, as 
shown by the outer circle in Figure 3-1, the average of B, C, D, E, F and G’s social capital indices 
was used to represent the neighborhood social capital of the central respondent A. The same 
processes were followed for all of the respondents, creating circles with radii of 60-500 meters in 
10 meter increments. For these manipulations, ArcMap10’s Generate Spatial Weight Matrix tool 
was used. 
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Figure 3-1. Conceptual diagram for defining “neighbors” as people living within 100 and 150 
meters of a central respondent 
 
Incidentally, this study did not necessarily argue that using physical distances among 
neighborhood residents is the best method for examining the link between neighborhood social 
capital and crime. For example, when researchers view neighborhood watches in each school 
district as a form of social capital and wish to examine their effect on crime, the school district is 
clearly the most appropriate area unit of analysis. However, if researchers attempt to resolve the 
areal unit problem of neighborhood research in which administrative areas are not consistently 
the appropriate unit of social capital, defining physical distances variably and exploring spatial 
scales that have a significant effect of social capital are a starting point for an approach to the 
MAUP. 
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Methods 
Data 
In 2009, the investigators of the present study mailed a questionnaire survey to 1,000 
residents of Musashino City in Tokyo, Japan. Musashino City is located in central Tokyo and has 
a population of 135,065. The subjects were selected from among the eligible voters using two-
stage random sampling. While Musashino City has the 13th largest population among Tokyo’s 
cities, it has the highest population density (12,990/km2). The response rate was 34.3%. 
In studies that focus on the spatial distance between residents (such as the present study), 
data from urban areas with high habitation densities are more appropriate than data from rural 
areas where there are many uninhabitable spaces. The reason is that in rural areas, large expanses 
of farm land, hills, or mountains likely separate residents. By contrast, in urban areas, accessibility 
is relatively homogeneous among neighborhoods, and geographic features (e.g., mountains and 
farm land) other than physical distances are less likely to separate residents. Therefore, in this 
study, the sampling survey was conducted in the urban area. 
Figure 3-2 represents point data that were created from the respondents’ coordinates, 
which were derived from their addresses. The respondents who experienced burglary 
victimization are shown as black points (because some of the respondents lived in the same 
condominium building, some points are represented by overlapping dots). Because this study used 
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a two-stage random sampling method, as previously mentioned, there are places where the density 
of respondents is sparse. 
 
 
Figure 3-2. Distribution of respondents in Musashino City 
 
Measurements 
This study measured the respondents’ trust in others, norms of reciprocity and social 
participation as social capital indices, according to previous studies (e.g., Kennedy et al., 1998; 
Lederman et al., 2002). Trust was assessed with the following items: “Most people can be trusted,” 
“Most people are basically good and kind” and “I basically trust other people.” The participants 
responded using a 4-point Likert scale (1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Agree, 4 = 
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Strongly agree). In the analysis, the average of these three items was used. 
Norms of reciprocity were measured with the following two items: “If someone helps 
you, you would also help any other person” and “If you see people cooperate with each other, you 
also feel that you would help someone in need.” The responses were also arranged on a 4-point 
Likert scale (1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Agree, 4 = Strongly agree). In the analysis, 
the average of these two items was used. 
For social participation, the respondents were asked whether they were members of the 
following 14 groups in their neighborhoods: neighborhood associations, parent-teacher 
associations, Japan Agricultural Cooperative or other business associations, labor associations, 
consumer cooperatives or other consumer organizations, volunteer groups, citizens’ organizations, 
religious organizations, alumni associations, political support groups, professional groups, 
cultural groups, play groups and child-rearing groups. The sum of participation was used in the 
analysis. 
Additionally, the first principal component score of the above three social capital indices 
(trust, norms of reciprocity, and social participation) was calculated and used as an index of total 
social capital. 
The study included sex, length of residence, annual household income and type of 
housing as sociodemographic covariates. For annual household income, the participants were 
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asked to identify their income level using 12 predetermined categories (1 = less than 2 million 
yen, 2 = 2-3 million yen, 3 = 3-4 million yen, 4 = 4-5 million yen, 5 = 5-6 million yen, 6 = 6-7 
million yen, 7 = 7-8 million yen, 8 = 8-10 million yen, 9 = 10-12 million yen, 10 = 12-14 million 
yen, 11 = 14-20 million yen, 12 = more than 20 million yen). Annual household income was 
treated as a continuous variable in the analyses. For type of housing, detached (free-standing) 
homes were coded as 1, and other types of homes were coded as 0. 
The dependent variable in this study, crime victimization, was measured by asking 
whether the respondents had been victims of a burglary over the past five years. The respondents 
who had been victimized were coded as 1, and those who had not been victimized were coded as 
0. 
 
Statistical analysis 
 As previously noted, this study changed the geographical range of “neighborhood” from 
60 to 500 meters in 10 meter increments and examined the varying effects of neighborhood trust, 
norms of reciprocity, social participation and the total social capital index on individual burglary 
victimizations for each “neighborhood” scale. For each analysis, binomial logistic regression was 
used. 
 Piecewise regression analyses were conducted to explore the trend of the variation in 
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the effect of social capital indices as the neighborhood scale changed. The piecewise regression 
method describes the changes in the data trends by connecting several different regression line 
segments at “join points.” The analysis begins with the minimum number of join points (0, 
representing a straight line) and tests the model’s fit with a maximum number of join points. In 
the present study’s analyses, the maximum number of join points was set as 4. For the piecewise 
regression analyses, the Joinpoint Regression Program (version 3.4.2), which was developed by 
the American National Cancer Institute, was used. 
 
Results 
Table 3-1 presents the descriptive statistics for Study 3. As Table 3-1 shows, 9.5% of 
the respondents had been victims of a burglary over the last five years. 
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Table 3-1. Descriptive statistics for Study 3 
 
 
 Next, binomial logistic regression analyses were conducted in which the geographic 
range of “neighborhood” was changed from 60 to 500 meters in 10-meter increments. For each 
neighborhood scale, the respondents who did not have two or more “neighbors” were omitted 
from the analysis for that scale. Therefore, when the neighborhood scale was small, the number 
of respondents who were included in the analyses was also small. Figure 3-3 shows the number 
of respondents who were included in the analyses and the average number of “other neighbors” 
included for each geographical range. The left vertical axis represents the number of respondents 
who were included in the analyses, and the right vertical axis represents the average number of 
Mean SD %
Generalized trust (4-point scale) (α=.774) Sex
"Most people can be trusted" 2.41 0.686 Male 47.9
"Most people are basically good and kind" 2.62 0.664 Female 52.1
"I basically trust in other people" 2.78 0.678
Annual household income
Norms of reciprocity (4-point scale) (α=.888) Less than 2 million yen 4.2
2-3 million yen 7.7
3-4 million yen 9.5
4-5 million yen 7.4
5-6 million yen 7.1
6-7 million yen 6.5
7-8 million yen 6.0
Social participation (0-14) 3.28 2.270 8-10 million yen 9.5
10-12 million yen 8.6
Years of residency 21.85 16.490 12-14 million yen 5.1
14-20 million yen 6.5
More than 20 million yen 5.1
NA/DK 16.7
Detached home 55.7
Burglary victimization 9.5
"If someone helps you, you would also
help any other person"
3.21 0.513
"If you see people who cooperate each
other, you also feel that you would help
someone in need"
3.23 0.598
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“other neighbors.” As Figure 3-3 shows, in these analyses, as the geographical range of the 
“neighborhood” narrowed, fewer respondents and “other neighbors” were included in the 
analyses. For example, the average number of “other neighbors” was 2.95 in the analysis of the 
60-meter neighborhood scale, whereas an average of 35 “other neighbors” was included in the 
analysis of the 500-meter neighborhood scale. When the neighborhood scale was small, the small 
number of observations might have caused statistical instability. Additionally, although the 
influence of outliers was a source of concern in the analyses of small neighborhoods because of 
the small number of respondents included as “other neighbors,” this study determined that the 
influence of outliers was low because the independent variables (i.e., trust, norms of reciprocity 
and social participation) were measured on a Likert scale (1-4) or a small range scale (0-14) and 
extreme outliers were not expected to emerge. 
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Figure 3-3. The number of respondents included in the analyses and the average number of 
“other neighbors” in each neighborhood geographical range 
 
Figures 3-4 to 3-7 represent the variation in the effects of trust, norms of reciprocity, 
social participation and the total social capital index (the first principal component score) on 
burglary victimization according to the neighborhood spatial scale. The vertical axis represents 
the regression coefficients of the social capital variable for each neighborhood geographical range, 
and the horizontal axis represents the range (meters) of the neighborhood. 
Additionally, approximate lines that represent the trend of the variation of social 
capital’s effects according to changes in the neighborhood geographical scales and their join 
points were described using a piecewise regression method. The βs in the figures are the slopes 
representing the variation of effects of each social capital index. 
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Figure 3-4. The variation of the effects of trust on burglary according to the geographical range 
of the “neighborhood” 
 
 
Figure 3-5. The variation of the effects of reciprocity on burglary according to the geographical 
range of the “neighborhood” 
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Figure 3-6. The variation of the effects of social participation on burglary according to the 
geographical range of the “neighborhood” 
 
 
Figure 3-7. The variation of the effects of total social capital (the first principal component 
score) on burglary according to the geographical range of the “neighborhood” 
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As Figure 3-4 shows, although trust demonstrated a crime reduction effect at the 60-
meter neighborhood range (the coefficient was -0.18), the effects began to shrink as the 
neighborhood range expanded. At 320 meters, however, the effects of trust began to strengthen 
again, with the largest coefficient (-0.25) appearing at 500 meters. As shown in Figure 3-5, 
although the effects of reciprocity grew with the geographical range of neighborhood for the first 
100 meters, the effects remained unchanged from the 160- to 500-meter neighborhood range. 
Although the effects of social participation increased according to the neighborhood spatial scale, 
as Figure 3-6 shows, the absolute values of the coefficients were quite small, suggesting that the 
social participation index used in this analysis is not appropriate for crime reduction. Figure 3-7 
shows that the total social capital index (the first principal component score) represented greater 
crime reduction effects as the neighborhood’s geographical range increased. 
 
Discussion 
 First, in terms of the covariate variables (i.e., sex, length of residence, annual household 
income, type of housing and individual-level social capital), the values did not vary with the 
geographic range of the neighborhood. Only the type of housing (detached house) was associated 
with burglary victimization, regardless of the neighborhood geographic range (the results of the 
covariates are not shown). That is, respondents who lived in detached houses were more likely to 
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be burglary victims than those who lived in housing complexes. The coefficients of the 
neighborhood social capital indices discussed below were adjusted for these covariates. 
 Although the coefficients of trust were negative (i.e., they had a strong preventive effect 
on crime) when the geographic ranges of neighborhood were small, the preventive effects became 
weaker as the neighborhood range widened (Figure 3-4). At the 320-meter mark, however, the 
crime prevention effects of trust began to grow stronger. The strongest preventive effect occurred 
at approximately the 500-meter neighborhood range, suggesting that the crime reduction effect of 
neighbors’ trust was significant both at the low and high ends of the neighborhood geographical 
range. 
 Concerning the effect of reciprocity, although the burglary prevention effect grew 
stronger as the geographical range of the neighborhood increased from 60 to 160 meters, the 
regression lines showed that the effects became weaker after the range passed the 160-meter mark 
(Figure 3-5). However, the points plotted on the figure showed that the preventive effect of 
reciprocity on crime remained nearly unchanged from 260 meters onwards. 
Although Figure 3-6 shows that the effects of social participation become stronger as 
the neighborhood’s geographic range increased, the absolute values of the coefficients are quite 
small in both the positive and negative directions (Figure 3-6). This result suggests that social 
participation, at least in this study, may not be an effective factor in preventing burglary. 
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According to Putnam (2000), social participation can be divided into two types, vertical and 
horizontal. Vertical social participation refers to participation in organizations or groups that 
exhibit differences in power, resources and social statuses among members. Horizontal social 
participation refers to participation in organizations or groups that are composed of families, 
friends and homogeneous people who are equal in terms of power and resources. Presumably, 
each type of social participation has different influences on crime victimization. Because the 
present study mixed the vertical and horizontal groups into a single index of social participation, 
the significant effects of social participation may not have been detected. A future study should 
examine the effect of each type of social participation because horizontal groups and vertical 
groups may have differing effects on crime. 
The total social capital index, that was the first principal component score of trust, 
reciprocity, and social participation, showed stronger effects when the geographical neighborhood 
ranges were wider (Figure 3-7). Starting at the 300-meter neighborhood range, the variation of 
coefficients became stable and showed constant crime prevention effects. The trends of the 
coefficients for reciprocity and total social capital suggest that the effects become stronger as the 
geographical neighborhood ranges widen and that the effects become stable beginning 
approximately at the midpoint (250-300 meters). 
 Trust showed a trend that differed from that of the other indices. Although the trends for 
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trust, reciprocity and total social capital were similar in that their crime prevention effects became 
stronger with widening geographic neighborhood ranges, trust showed strong preventive effects 
at small geographical ranges. In other words, in small neighborhood geographical ranges, a trust-
specific prevention process may exist. It is suggested that the crime reduction effect of neighbors’ 
trust is found in areas that are either smaller or larger than those defined by administrative 
boundaries (the average size of administrative areas (choumoku) in Musashino City is 0.2111 
km2; however, the present study’s 60-meter “neighborhood” was approximately 0.0113 km2, and 
the 500-meter neighborhood was approximately 0.785 km2). Thus, these results suggest that 
administrative boundaries may not provide the most appropriate spatial scale for detecting the 
effect of neighborhood trust on crime. 
What is responsible for the bipolarity of the crime-reducing effects of trust? Several 
theories from criminal sociology and environmental criminology may offer clues. Researchers 
have accumulated considerable knowledge about neighborhood crime control, and much of this 
control is closely related to social capital. We can interpret the crime reduction effect in 
neighborhoods with a wide geographical range from the perspective of the systemic model 
(Bursik & Grasmick, 1993). The systemic model focuses on both informal social control by 
neighborhood residents and formal social control by public institutions. This model assumes that 
trust and social ties among neighborhood residents make resources from public institutions for 
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crime control accessible; this is the process of formal social control. In this model, the crime 
reduction effect of neighborhood residents’ trust is supplemented by the formal social control of 
the police. Furthermore, the spatial scale of the neighborhood where the effect of trust becomes 
significant depends on the geographical range covered by the police. The police cover a wide 
geographical neighborhood area (e.g., a town or a school district) rather than a small geographical 
neighborhood area, such as a block. Thus, from the viewpoint of this model, we can predict that 
the crime reduction effect of trust increases as the spatial scale of the neighborhood used as the 
unit of analysis increases. 
The present study also found that trust had strong crime reduction effects on the narrow-
range neighborhoods. We can interpret this result as an effect of “management activities” among 
immediate neighbors (e.g., cleanup activities). For example, “signs of occupancy” (Cirel et al., 
1977) suggest that neighborhood residents care about their community and demonstrate crime 
reduction effects. Although it is assumed that the systemic model’s crime-control process emerges 
in fairly wide-ranging neighborhoods, it is also assumed that the crime reduction effect of “signs 
of occupancy” stems from the appearance that residents care for their close neighbors. 
Incidentally, some studies have noted that the variable used as an index of generalized 
trust may not accurately reflect the concept of generalized trust (Grootaert & van Bastelaer, 2002; 
Tsuji & Harihara, 2002). In many cases, respondents may imagine people whom they know well 
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when answering the generalized trust questions. Theoretically and ideally, the definition of 
“others” in the question item on trust should be changed according to the range used to define the 
neighborhood unit. Future studies must measure respondents’ trust in multiple subjects and more 
precisely examine the effects of trust on neighborhood crime. 
In summary, the results of the present study suggest that the effects of trust on crime 
vary depending on the geographic definition of the neighborhood. These findings indicate that 
traditional multilevel analyses using one type of administrative boundary may not always 
accurately detect the effects of social capital. In addition, these results suggest that multiple crime 
reduction processes may occur in neighborhoods across a range of geographic areas. 
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Study 4:  A Spatial Exploration of Multiple Crime Reduction Mechanisms in 
Neighborhoods 
 
Introduction 
Study 3 explored variation in the effects of trust, reciprocity, social participation and the 
summary measure of social capital on burglary victimization according to the geographical scale 
of the “neighborhood” and found multiple geographical scales (including narrow and wide 
neighborhood spatial scales) for which trust had strong crime reduction effects. This result 
suggests that multiple distinct crime reduction processes may exist within a geographical scale. 
The next question, then, is “What strengthens the crime reduction effects of trust at both 
wide and narrow neighborhood geographical ranges?” Perhaps the mechanisms that mediate the 
link between social capital and crime differ according to the size of the neighborhood’s 
geographical range. For example, in the field of public health, Kawachi (1999) stated that the 
mechanisms of community health advancement through social capital differed depending on the 
level of aggregation of social capital. This argument is also applicable to criminal research. 
Williams and McShane (2003) categorized criminological theories into macrotheory, microtheory 
and bridging theory according to their levels of explanation (i.e., an entire society, a specific 
hierarchical level within the society or a small group, respectively). 
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In Bursik and Grasmick’s (1993) systemic model, trust in others makes neighbors’ 
informal social control and public institutions’ (e.g., police) resources accessible; therefore, the 
effective unit of analysis may depend on the geographical range that public institutions can cover. 
In comparison, regarding the mechanism by which community management activities (such as 
cleanup activities) represent “signs of occupancy” in a neighborhood and, therefore, reduce crime 
(Cirel et al., 1977), the crime reduction process may be observed over relatively small 
geographical ranges. 
The present study hypothesized that the variation in the effect of social trust on burglary 
victimization according to the geographical range of neighborhoods varies according to its 
mediation by the following two mechanisms: (1) the systemic model – neighborhood trust makes 
available both informal social control by neighborhood residents and police resources (i.e., formal 
social control); (2) signs of occupancy – neighborhood management activities are facilitated in 
communities that are affluent in social capital; therefore, criminal behaviors are reduced in such 
communities. 
In the analyses, the aggregate level of “neighborhood” represented in Figures 3-8 and 
3-9 was changed from 50 to 1,000 meters in 10-meter increments. 
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Figure 3-8. Schematic of the signs of occupancy model 
 
 
Figure 3-9. Schematic of the systemic model 
 
Methods 
Data 
In 2009, the investigators of this study mailed a questionnaire survey to 1,000 residents 
of Arakawa Ward in Tokyo, Japan. The Arakawa Ward has a population of 191,207. The subjects 
were chosen from among the eligible voters using two-stage random sampling. The response rate 
was 45.6%. 
Table 3-2 shows the population characteristics of Arakawa Ward and the average 
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population of Tokyo’s 23 wards. The descending order rankings of each population characteristic 
for Arakawa Ward compared with Tokyo’s other 22 wards are shown in parentheses. As Table 3-
2 shows, a feature of this area is that the population and the number of households are relatively 
low but the population density is rather high. As with the analytic framework of Study 3, sampling 
from areas with relatively high residential density was desirable in this study. Thus, to make mail 
survey data appropriate to the spatial analyses, this study randomly sampled respondents from 
geographically successive areas. Figure 3-10 represents the point data that were created by 
translating the respondents’ addresses into GPS coordinates. 
 
Table 3-2. Population characteristics of Arakawa Ward 
 
 
 Average of Tokyo
23 Wards
Population 191,207 (18 / 23) 369,115.3
The number of households 86,229 (20 / 23) 174,995.0
Population density (km2) 18,745.8 (3 / 23) 594.1
Popuration growth rate 6.0 (9 / 23) 4.4
Arakawa Ward
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Figure 3-10. Distribution of the respondents in Arakawa Ward 
 
Measurements 
As a dependent variable, crime victimization was measured by asking whether the 
respondents had experienced burglary victimization in the past five years. The respondents who 
experienced burglary victimization were coded as 1, and other respondents were coded as 0. 
The respondents’ generalized trust was measured as a social capital index. Generalized 
trust was assessed using the following items: “Most people can be trusted” and “Most people are 
basically good and kind.” The responses were arranged on a 4-point Likert scale (1 = Strongly 
disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Agree, 4 = Strongly agree). The average of these two items was used 
in the analyses. 
As an index of neighborhood management activities, the respondents’ participation in 
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cleanup activities and neighborhood meetings was measured. Neighborhood management activity 
was assessed using the following questions: “How often do you participate in cleanup activities 
in your community’s parks and streets with your neighbors?” and “How often do you participate 
in neighborhood community association meetings?” The responses were arranged on a 4-point 
Likert scale (1 = Never participate, 2 = Participate infrequently, 3 = Sometimes participate, 4 = 
Frequently participate). In the analyses, the average of these two items was used as an indicator 
of signs of occupancy. 
The survey items that constituted the systemic model indices included items related to 
collective efficacy, trust in the police, informal social control and formal social control (perceived 
social control by the police). For the collective efficacy variables, the respondents were asked 
about the likelihood that their neighbors could be counted on to take action if “Children were 
skipping school and hanging out on a street corner,” “A fight broke out in front of their house” 
and “Children were spray-painting graffiti on a local building.” The responses were arranged on 
a 4-point Likert scale (1 = Cannot be counted on at all, 2 = Can scarcely be counted on, 3 = Can 
be counted on somewhat, 4 = Can be counted on). Trust in the police was assessed using the 
following items: “The police can be trusted,” “Police officers are honest,” “The police share the 
spirit of crime prevention with citizens” and “The police are fair.” The responses were arranged 
on a 4-point Likert scale (1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Agree, 4 = Strongly agree). 
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Informal social control was assessed using the following questions: “How often do you see your 
neighbors foot/bicycle patrol in your neighborhood?” and “How often do you see surveillance 
activities by neighbors on the school roads in your neighborhood?” The responses were arranged 
on a 4-point Likert scale (1 = Never see, 2 = See infrequently, 3 = Sometimes see, 4 = Frequently 
see). Formal social control was assessed using the following questions: “How often do you see 
the police watch and foot/bicycle patrol in your neighborhood?” and “How often do you see patrol 
cars in your neighborhood?” The responses were arranged on a 4-point Likert scale (1 = Never 
see, 2 = See infrequently, 3 = Sometimes see, 4 = Frequently see). Although actual local police 
activity records are the ideal index of formal social controls, the current study used the 
respondents’ perceptions about the local police activities as a proxy because the official and 
objective data were not available. In the analysis, the averages of the above items were used as 
each systemic model’s index. 
Sex, length of residence, type of housing, perceived social class and educational 
attainment were included as control variables. For type of housing, detached (free-standing) 
homes were coded as 1, and all other types were coded as 0. 
 
Statistical analysis 
As previously noted, this study changed the geographical range of the “neighborhood” 
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from 50 to 1,000 meters in 10-meter increments and examined the variation of the effects of 
neighborhood trust on individual burglary victimization for each geographical neighborhood scale. 
The signs of occupancy model (Figure 3-8) and the systemic model (Figure 3-9) were used to link 
social capital to crime victimization, and the indirect effects of social capital on burglary were 
extracted. 
Piecewise regression analyses were conducted to explore the trends of variation of the 
indirect effect of social capital according to the changes in the neighborhood range and their 
breakpoints. The methods and software used for the piecewise regression are identical to those 
used in Study 3. 
 
Results 
Table 3-3 shows the descriptive statistics of Study 4. The percentage of respondents who 
experienced burglary victimization was 7.7%. Although this figure is lower than that of Study 3 
(9.5%), the difference was considered to be slight. 
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Table 3-3. Descriptive statistics of Study 4 
 
 
As examples of the present study’s spatial analyses, Figures 3-11 and 3-12 show the 
Items Mean SD Items %
Generalized trust (4-point scale) (r =.756) Sex
"Most people can be trusted" 2.34 0.74 Male 46.5
"Most people are basically good and kind" 2.56 0.77 Female 53.5
Mean 2.55 0.71
Perceived social class
High 2.2
Upper middle 21.1
Lower middle 37.0
"Participation in cleanup activities" 1.42 0.67 Upper lower 14.9
Mean 1.46 0.65 Lowest 4.9
DK/NA 19.9
Collective efficacy (4-point scale) (α=.825)
Educational attainment
Elementary school 0.0
Junior high school 4.3
High school 34.6
University 28.4
Graduate school 3.3
DK/NA 6.1
Mean 2.42 0.64
Detached home 46.6
Trust in the police (4-point scale) (α=.876)
"The police can be trusted" 2.77 0.80
"Police officers are honest" 3.04 0.74
"The police is fair" 2.60 0.81
Mean 2.77 0.68
Informal social control (4-point scale) (r  = .447)
Foot/bicycle patrol by neighbors 2.61 0.80
Surveillance activities on the children's
way to and from school
2.95 0.95
Mean 2.77 0.75
Formal social control (4-point scale) (r  = .576)
Watch and foot/bicycle patrol by police
officers
3.16 0.73
Patrol cars in neighborhood 3.12 0.73
Mean 3.14 0.65
Years of residency 27.68 19.40
Two year college/higher professional
school
23.3
"The police share the spirit to crime
prevention with citizens"
2.65 0.81
Burglary victimization in the past 5
years
7.7
"If a fight broke out in front of my house,
my neighbors would intervene to prevent
it"
2.40
"Participation in meetings of neighborhood
community association"
1.48 0.77
"If children were skipping school and
hanging out on a street corner, my
neighbors would call to them"
Neighborhood management activities (4-point scale)
(r  = .579)
2.29 0.74
"If children were spray-painting graffiti on
a local building, my neighbors would warn
them"
2.58 0.75
0.73
91 
 
results of the signs of occupancy model and the systemic model, respectively, when the 
geographical scale of the neighborhood is set at 50 meters. Although control variables (including 
sex, length of residence, perceived social class, type of housing, and educational attainment) were 
included as independent variables for all of the endogenous variables, their coefficients are 
omitted from the figures. These figures demonstrate that the total indirect effect of trust on 
burglary was -0.29 in the signs of occupancy model and -0.11 in the systemic model for a 
neighborhood with a 50-meter range. 
 
 
Figure 3-11. The results of path analysis for the signs of occupancy model with a 50-meter 
neighborhood geographical scale 
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Figure 3-12. The results of path analysis for the systemic model with a 50-meter neighborhood 
geographical scale 
 
The analyses were conducted, with changing the geographical range of the 
neighborhood from 50 to 1,000 meters in 10-meter increments. In the analysis of each 
geographical scale, respondents who did not have two or more “other neighbors” were omitted. 
Figure 3-13 shows the number of respondents who were included in the analyses and the average 
number of “other neighbors” for each geographical scale. The left vertical axis represents the 
number of respondents who were included in the analyses, and the right vertical axis represents 
the average number of “other neighbors.” As Figure 3-13 shows, in the present analyses, as the 
neighborhood ranges narrowed, the number of respondents included in the analyses and the 
number of “other neighbors” decreased. For example, the average number of “other neighbors” 
was 2.84 in the analysis for a 50-meter neighborhood range, whereas it was 290.79 in the analysis 
for a 1,000-meter neighborhood range. This association suggests that the small number of 
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observations in the analyses may have resulted in the instability of the neighborhood indices when 
the neighborhood ranges were small. However, in reality, examining the effects of small 
neighborhoods’ social capital refers to examining the effects of a handful of people in a rather 
close neighborhood; therefore, this method is appropriate for modeling the real world. 
 
 
Figure 3-13. The number of respondents included in the analyses and the average number of 
“other neighbors” in each neighborhood geographical range 
 
Figures 3-14 and 3-15 represent the variation in the indirect effects of trust on burglary 
victimization in each model according to the neighborhood’s spatial scale. 
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Figure 3-14. Indirect effects of trust on burglary victimization in the signs of occupancy model 
 
 
Figure 3-15. Indirect effects of trust on burglary victimization in the systemic model 
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The vertical axes represent the indirect effects of trust, and the horizontal axes represent 
the geographical range of the neighborhood. In both figures, it was determined that 1 break point 
(join point) was the most appropriate number. That is, there are two slopes in each figure. The  
values in the figures are the coefficients of each slope of the variation of social capital effects. 
Figure 3-14 (the signs of occupancy model) shows that the indirect effects of trust resulting from 
neighborhood management activities were greater for smaller neighborhoods. By contrast, in 
Figure 3-15 (the systemic model), the indirect effects were greater for larger neighborhoods. 
 
Discussion 
First, the results of the signs of occupancy model (Figure 3-14) demonstrated that the 
preventive effects of social capital on crime were strong when the defined “neighborhoods” were 
small. The approximate lines described by piecewise regression showed that the preventive effects 
of social capital gradually weakened in a linear fashion as the neighborhood size approached 630 
meters. Although the preventive effects of social capital on burglary strengthened slowly from 
630 meters onwards, its slope was relatively gradual. 
In comparison, the results of the systemic model (Figure 3-15) showed that when 
“neighborhoods” were defined using a larger geographical range, the preventive effects of social 
capital on crime were stronger. Although the approximate lines traced by piecewise regression 

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indicated a break point at 300 meters, there was no rapid change in slope, and the indirect effects 
of social capital substantively increased linearly in a negative direction according to the 
geographical range of the neighborhood. These results suggest that the estimations from the 
analyses differed depending on the defined geographical neighborhood ranges and that traditional 
multilevel models that rely on simple administrative boundaries may be unable to detect the 
significant effect of social capital, depending on the type of boundary used. 
Moreover, the results of the present study suggest that different crime prevention 
processes arise through social capital (social trust) in neighborhoods on both small and large 
geographical scales. A comparison of the above two models suggests that the most effective 
geographical range of a neighborhood varies with the models. The crime prevention effect that 
results from creating “signs of occupancy,” that is, an atmosphere that suggests that “community 
residents take an interest in their neighborhood” and “community residents manage their 
neighborhood,” is expressed in the whisker-close neighborhood around one’s home. In the 
systemic model, in communities where residents participate in the neighborhood watch and 
neighborhood patrol, both informal social controls by neighborhood residents and formal controls 
by the police are facilitated (Bennett, 1990; Bennett, Holloway, & Farrington, 2006). Because this 
model suggests that the crime control effect of neighborhood residents’ trust is enhanced by 
adding formal social control through police interventions, the geographical ranges of 
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neighborhoods where the crime control effects become strong depend on the geographical scale 
on which the police can intervene. Typically, the police intervene on the basis of relatively larger 
geographical scales (e.g., wards, towns, and school districts) rather than small spatial scales, such 
as blocks. Therefore, the indirect effects of trust in the systemic model increase according to the 
geographic range of neighborhoods used in the analyses. 
As the present study shows, exploring the geographical range at which trust effectively 
functions can provide practical information for town development. That is, we can use these 
findings as clues to suggest the type of crime-control mechanism that should be adopted and the 
neighborhood size that should be targeted. For example, given the idea that interactions among 
neighborhood residents (e.g., volunteer activities, fund-raising activities and so on) help residents 
develop trust in each other (Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam et al., 1993), the organization of cleanup 
activities based on block associations can facilitate both trust among the residents and crime 
prevention through the creation of signs of occupancy. Similarly, if a local town or multiple 
neighborhood associations organize such activities on a relatively larger geographical scale and 
enhance trust among residents, the systemic model should be effective. In this way, the present 
study also suggests the effective geographical ranges of such activities for crime control. 
Two limitations of this study should be noted. First, in the examination of the systemic 
model, this study used the respondents’ perceptions of local police activities as a proxy variable 
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for the formal controls conducted by the police. However, the residents’ perceptions may differ 
from actual police activities. For example, people who do not trust the police may underestimate 
the frequency of local police activities. To exclude such biases, official records of police activities 
should be used in future studies. Second, Arakawa Ward has a relatively high population density 
among Tokyo’s 23 wards. That is, this area can be considered highly urbanized, which may affect 
the generalizability of the study findings. A future study should examine whether the variation of 
the effects of social capital according to the neighborhood range is a characteristic of high 
population density areas only or whether it can be applied to other general urban areas. To advance 
research on crime prevention through social capital and to apply these findings to the real world, 
similar studies in areas with characteristics that differ from those of the present study’s target area 
must be conducted to verify the generalizability of the results. 
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Chapter 4 THE IMPACT OF CRIME ON SOCIETY 
 
Study 5: The Effects of Crime on Social Ties and Social Participation in Neighborhoods 
 
Introduction 
Studies 1-4 examined how neighborhood social capital affects crime and crime 
prevention. Study 5 focuses on the effect of crime on local communities or the people embedded 
in neighborhoods. Traditionally, the effects of crime on communities have received researchers’ 
attention in the form of “reaction to crime” studies. Researchers have mainly studied people’s 
reactions to crime from the viewpoint of the fear of crime (Skogan & Maxfield, 1981). Recently, 
studies on the effect of crime on social participation have also accumulated, addressing the 
question, “Does crime determine the level of neighborhood social ties and participation?” 
Examinations of the “reaction to crime” from the perspective of social capital are 
important. The effects of neighborhood social capital on the residents’ outcomes (e.g., crime 
victimization and health) have aroused researchers’ interests, whereas interest in the determinants 
of social capital have been relatively lacking (Hanibuchi & Nakaya, 2013). Some studies have 
shown that various individual-level characteristics, such as educational attainment, marital status, 
age, sex, income, and working status, determine individuals’ degree of trust and social 
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participation (Groot et al., 2007; Huang et al., 2003; Kaasa & Parts, 2008). For example, because 
high income and education level are associated with affluent individual social capital 
(Subramanian et al., 2003), we can assume that an area that is inhabited by many residents with 
high socioeconomic status is likely to be a neighborhood with affluent social capital. 
Environmental factors such as neighborhood walkability can facilitate residents’ interactions with 
each other and, thus, the development of neighborhood social capital (Hanibuchi et al., 2012; 
Leyden, 2003). In addition to such neighborhood environmental factors, studies on the effects of 
neighborhood safety on residents’ social ties and participation have increased (Takagi, 2011). 
Given that many studies have demonstrated the positive effects of social capital on neighborhoods, 
it is important to clarify the reasons that some neighborhoods have more social capital than others 
and use this information to improve neighborhood circumstances. 
Unfortunately, this area of research on the effects of neighborhood crime on social 
capital has been characterized by inconsistent findings: The mixed findings range from studies 
that find no association between rising neighborhood crime rates and levels of neighborhood 
social ties and trust; to other studies which find the opposite, i.e., crime leads to a strengthening 
of social ties. Other studies have found that residents tend to withdraw socially in response to high 
crime rates. For example, Perkins, Brown, and Taylor (1996) conducted individual- and block-
level investigations in New York City, Baltimore, and Salt Lake City in the U.S. Longitudinal 
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data on crime were used to predict the presence of block associations seven years later. The 
authors concluded that crime and the fear of crime were not associated with residents’ social 
participation. Perkins, Hughey, and Speer (2002) argued that crime alone may not be a sufficient 
stimulus to boost the level of community organization. 
Taylor (1996) examined whether the neighborhood-level crime rate affects community 
attachment and social involvement (a summary measure of local social ties, neighborhood 
surveillance, visits to neighbors’ house, etc.) using data from 1,622 individuals embedded in 66 
neighborhoods in Baltimore. Controlling for residential stability and education, the researchers 
found that neighborhoods with higher crime rates exhibited higher neighborhood attachment and 
involvement among residents. In other words, the presence of crime brought the residents together 
to combat the external threat. Thus, in contrast to the conventional view that crime and related 
problems fragment the community (Conklin, 1975), Taylor concluded that they may mobilize the 
community. Similarly, Berkowitz (2000) and Wandersman and Florin (2000) also showed that 
social problems, including an increase in crime, tend to promote residents’ social participation. 
In a third set of studies, Logan and Molothc (1987) suggested that high crime rates 
inhibit residents’ attachment to their neighborhoods by increasing their sense of alienation and 
undermining neighborhood values. Skogan (1990) also provided support for the adverse effect of 
crime on neighborhood cohesion. His neighborhood-level analysis that was conducted in several 
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dozen neighborhoods suggested that social and physical disorder had an adverse influence on 
neighborhood attachment. He found that perceived disorder reduced residents’ satisfaction with 
the neighborhood and increased their intentions to move away. Thus, his findings suggest that an 
increase in crime constrains cooperation among residents and leads people to withdraw socially. 
Saegert and Winkel (2004) investigated the association between crime rates and social 
participation using individual- and dwelling-level data. First, their results suggest that the 
individual-level perception of crime is linked to low informal socialization, low participation in 
tenant associations and weak social norms. In addition, they found that past experiences with 
assaults and homicides were associated with lower social norms at the building level, low informal 
socialization and low participation in tenant associations. Whereas some crime indices have 
displayed an encouraging influence on community organizations, Saegert and Winkel concluded 
that, overall, the depressive effect of crime on social participation outweighed the facilitation 
effect. They suggested that crime spurs fear and suspicion about neighbors that erode the 
community’s ability to organize and, as a result, weaken residents’ motivations to participate in 
community-based activities. 
Some researchers have hypothesized that residential stability is the key factor that 
determines whether crime facilitates or inhibits social participation. Social disorganization 
theorists argue that residents react to rising crime by exercising greater informal social control 
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(e.g., organizing neighborhood patrols); however, the extent of the response may depend on the 
extent of pre-existing neighborhood social disorganization. In socially disorganized 
neighborhoods, residents are unable to work together toward achieving common goals and values, 
i.e., they have low collective efficacy (Bursik, 1988; Kornhauser, 1978). 
The present study examined the effect of neighborhood crime on social participation 
based on generalized trust theory. Trust can be described as the expectation that people will 
behave with benign intentions and that they will strive to meet their civic commitments and avoid 
harming others (Barber, 1983). Generalized trust refers to an individual’s perception of the 
trustworthiness of the “average person” – i.e., an individual who is neither a friend nor an 
acquaintance (Robinson & Jackson, 2001). Yamagishi and Yamagishi (1994) argued that this type 
of generalized trust reflects “a belief in the benevolence of human nature in general” (1994: 139). 
It is known that people’s fear of crime is biased (Shimada, 2011). That is, the actual 
number of crimes differs from the perceived number of crimes. Excessive provisions against 
crime derived from the unrealistic fear of crime may restrict acquaintanceships and reduce 
people’s social relationships. Conversely, trust in others may affect the reaction in a “good 
direction.” One example of impairments in social capital due to crime is the reduction of social 
networks and social participation caused by rising crime. However, if cognitive social capital, i.e., 
trust in others, can buffer the impairment, it may be an effective means of protecting social capital. 
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In addition, Putnam (1993. 2000) originally stated that the structural aspects (i.e., social ties and 
social participation) and cognitive aspects (i.e., trust and norms of reciprocity) of social capital 
influence one other. Namely, affluent social ties create trust and norms, and trust and norms, in 
turn, facilitate people’s interactions and social participations. Even in a potentially difficult 
situation in which an exogenous factor, such as rising crime, deteriorates the structural social 
capital in a neighborhood, cognitive social capital, such as trust, may be able to repair it. However, 
the complementary relationship between factors of social capital has not been examined. If a 
buffering effect of cognitive social capital (i.e., trust) on other factors of social capital (i.e., social 
ties and social participation) is found, interventions that enhance social trust can be recommended 
to prevent a reduction in structural social capital in neighborhoods that face problems such as an 
increase in crime. 
In summary, we must take into account two distinct and opposing mechanisms through 
which neighborhood crime may affect social ties and social participation. That is, neighborhood 
crime decrease broad acquaintanceship ties, while it increases intimate social ties to combat with 
crime. The net impact of crime on social ties is likely to reflect a mix of these two types of effects; 
moreover, it is likely to be moderated by existing levels of social trust among neighbors. 
The present study measured people’s friendship ties, acquaintanceship ties and social 
participation using a mail survey and investigated how these variables were affected by past 
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neighborhood crime. In addition, the cross-level interaction term between generalized trust and 
neighborhood-level crime was examined. This study hypothesized that neighborhood crime 
increases residents’ friendship ties while decreasing mere acquaintanceship ties. Furthermore, this 
study assumed that these effects are moderated by the level of trust in others. As Figure 4-1 shows, 
this study examined the effects of crime on social participation as mediated by friendship ties and 
acquaintanceship ties. 
 
 
Figure 4-1. A schematic of the analytical model used in Study 5a 
a The directions of all interaction effects are assumed to be positive 
 
Methods 
Data 
In 2009, the investigators of this study mailed a questionnaire to residents aged 20-69 
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years in Tokyo’s Musashino City (n = 1,000) and Kiyose City (n = 1,000). Musashino City is the 
13th largest of Tokyo’s 26 cities in terms of population (138,734), and it has the highest population 
density (12,990/km2). By contrast, Kiyose City is the 23rd largest of Tokyo’s cities in terms of 
population (74,104) and has the 14th highest population density (7,289/km2). In each city, the 
subjects were chosen from among the eligible voters using a two-stage clustered random sampling 
strategy. In the first stage, the investigators randomly sampled 10 voter registration ledgers from 
each city. In the second stage, the investigators randomly sampled 100 individuals from each voter 
registration ledger. The response rates were 33.6% for Musashino City and 30.6% for Kiyose City. 
Respondents with missing values were omitted from the analyses. As a result, 436 individual-
level observations were used in the analyses. 
Because of its high mobility and population density, Musashino City can be considered 
a typical urban area. By contrast, Kiyose City can be described as relatively less urbanized 
compared with other urban regions in Japan. The indicators of the degree of urbanization (e.g., 
the mobility and density of the population) may affect the number of social ties, which is an 
intervening variable of this study. However, the effects of the crime rate adjusted for the degree 
of urbanization can be examined by obtaining data from both an area with a high population 
density and an area with a relatively low population density. 
To explore the impact of neighborhood crime on social participation, multilevel analyses 
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using both individual- and neighborhood-level data were conducted. The neighborhood-level unit 
in this study was the choumoku, which is a small neighborhood unit in Japan (the average areal 
size of the target areas for this survey was 0.2223 km2). Forty-three neighborhood units were 
included in the present analyses. 
 
Measurements 
For the social participation variable, an ultimate outcome of this study, the sum of  the 
respondents’ participation in the following five neighborhood associations was used: residents’ 
associations, volunteer groups, Japan Agricultural Cooperatives or business associations, citizens’ 
organizations, and political support groups. 
The number of friendship ties was measured with the following item: “How many 
friends do you have in your city?” The number of acquaintanceship ties was measured with the 
following item: “How many acquaintances (other than your friends) do you have in your city?” 
The friendship and acquaintanceship ties were not measured on a scale. Because responses to this 
type of question have a power law distribution or a lognormal distribution, responses to these 
network items were transformed into natural logarithms. 
Generalized trust was assessed with the following items: “Most people can be trusted,” 
“Most people are basically good and kind” and “I basically trust other people.” The responses 
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were captured on a 4-point Likert scale (1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Agree, 4 = 
Strongly agree). In the analysis, the average of these three items was used. 
Sex, duration of residence, annual household income, educational attainment and fear 
of crime as well as a dummy variable for Musashino City were included as control variables. For 
annual household income, the participants were asked to identify their income level using 12 
predetermined categories (1 = less than 2 million yen, 2 = 2-3 million yen, 3 = 3-4 million yen, 4 
= 4-5 million yen, 5 = 5-6 million yen, 6 = 6-7 million yen, 7 = 7-8 million yen, 8 = 8-10 million 
yen, 9 = 10-12 million yen, 10 = 12-14 million yen, 11 = 14-20 million yen, 12 = more than 20 
million yen). Annual household income was treated as a continuous variable in the analyses. 
Educational attainment was obtained from responses to one question that asked participants to 
select one response from 6 categories (1 = elementary school, 2 = junior high school, 3 = high 
school, 4 = two-year college/technical college, 5 = four-year college, 6 = graduate school). The 
educational attainment variable was also treated as a continuous variable in the analyses. Fear of 
crime was assessed by asking about each respondent’s fear of “theft,” “assault,” “burglary” and 
“purse-snatching” victimization. The responses were arranged on a 4-point Likert scale (1 = Not 
anxious at all, 2 = Not very anxious, 3 = Somewhat anxious, 4 = Highly anxious). In the analysis, 
the average of these four items was used. 
For the indices of neighborhood-level crime, this study used the number of larcenies 
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(e.g., burglary of private homes, breaking/entering a business office, and breaking/entering a 
store) and other instances of theft (e.g., motor vehicle theft, vehicle load theft, purse-snatching, 
and pick-pocketing) per choumoku reported by the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department from 
January to December 2008. Although some previous studies have measured respondents’ 
experiences of crime victimization, self-reported victimization is thought to be overestimated by 
selection bias and recall bias. Thus, when a crime-related index is included in analyses as a 
neighborhood-level explanatory variable, the official crime record is less likely to produce bias 
than the aggregated individual responses regarding crime victimization. Therefore, this study used 
the official crime numbers reported by the public agency. These indices were translated into the 
number of crimes per 1,000 people using each choumoku’s denominator population from census 
data. In the analyses, the crime rates were transformed into natural logarithms. 
 
Statistical analysis 
A multilevel regression model was used, with the individual level as level 1 and the 
neighborhood level as level 2. The neighborhood-level unit was the choumoku (n = 43). The 
average number of respondents who were embedded in each choumoku was 10.1. The software 
used was HLM6. 
The present study’s analyses included two stages. First, models estimating the effects of 
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neighborhood-level crime rates and the cross-level interactions (individual-level trust × 
neighborhood-level crime rates) on the number of friendship ties and acquaintanceship ties were 
analyzed. Second, friendship ties and acquaintanceship ties were included as independent 
variables in addition to the above-mentioned independent variables, and the effects of these 
explanatory variables on the respondents’ social participation were explored. In the latter analysis, 
because social participation was represented as count data, a multilevel Poisson regression 
analysis was conducted. 
 
Results 
Table 4-1 contains the descriptive statistics for the individual-level variables and 
neighborhood-level crime data from the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department. 
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Table 4-1. Descriptive statistics of Study 5 
 
a The values for the number of social ties and the crime rates shown in this table have not been transformed 
into natural logarithms. 
 
Table 4-2 shows the main effects of crime rates on friendship ties (Model 1) and 
acquaintanceship ties (Model 2). In addition, the table shows the cross-level interaction effects of 
individual-level trust and neighborhood-level crime rates on the network indices. 
Items Mean SD Items %
Friendship ties
a 5.80 9.94 Sex
Acquaintanceship ties
a 9.48 26.57 Male 44.3
Female 55.7
Generalized trust (4-point scale) (r  = .807)
"Most people can be trusted" 2.39 0.70 Annual household income
"Most people are basically good and kind" 2.57 0.68 Less than 2 million yen 6.3
"I basically trust in other people" 2.75 0.66 2-3 million yen 7.8
Mean 2.57 0.58 3-4 million yen 9.9
4-5 million yen 9.3
Social participation (0-5) 0.86 1.11 5-6 million yen 7.9
6-7 million yen 7.2
Years of residence 21.47 16.09 7-8 million yen 5.6
8-10 million yen 10.3
Fear of crime (4-point scale) (α = .907) 10-12 million yen 5.8
Theft 2.72 0.85 12-14 million yen 3.9
Assault 2.63 0.84 14-20 million yen 4.5
Burglary 3.12 0.76 More than 20 million yen 2.8
Purse-snatching 2.85 0.80 DK/NA 18.6
Mean 2.83 0.70
Educational attainment
Elementary school 0.2
Junior high school 7.6
High school 34.9
2008 Larceny - property break-in 2.37 1.64 Two year college/technical college 21.4
2008 Larceny - other forms of theft 10.42 13.33 University 30.6
Graduate school 3.6
DK/NA 1.6
City of residence
Kiyose City 47.2
Musashino City 52.8
The crime rates (per 1,000 people)
(Neighborhood-level variable)
a
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Table 4-2. Main effects and interaction effects of the crime rates on social ties 
 
 
As predicted, past neighborhood-level burglaries had a positive effect on friendship ties 
(coefficient = 0.17, p < .05) and a negative effect on acquaintanceship ties (coefficient = -0.68, p 
<. 05). The cross-level interaction effect of neighborhood-level burglaries and individual-level 
trust was positive for the number of acquaintanceship ties in Model 2 (coefficient = 0.28, p < .05). 
This result demonstrated that the effect of generalized trust on increasing acquaintanceship ties 
was large in neighborhoods where the level of crime was high. Figure 4-2 represents the cross-
Independent Variables Coefficient Coefficient
Individual-level Variables
Intercept 0.17 0.79 †
Sex (male = 1, female = 0) -0.42 *** -0.33 **
Duration of residency 0.02 *** 0.02 ***
Annual household income 0.03 † 0.04 *
Educational background -0.05 -0.17 *
Musashino City (dummy) -0.17 0.05
Trust 0.15 * 0.13 *
Reciprocity 0.11 * 0.08
Fear of crime 0.09 0.09
Neighborhood-level Variables
2008 Larceny on burglary 0.17 * -0.68 *
2008 Larceny on non-burglary 0.02 0.09
Individual × Neighborhood
Trust × Burglary 0.16 † 0.28 *
Trust × Non-burglary -0.02 -0.02
Random Effect
Intercept 0.06 0.01
Individual-Level n 436 436
Neighborhood-Level n 43 43
Note: ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, †p<.10
Model 1 Model 2
Friendship ties Acquaintance ties
Variance
Component
Variance
Component
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level interaction effect of burglary and trust on acquaintanceship ties. 
 
 
Figure 4-2. Cross-level interaction effect of larceny (property break-in) and trust on 
acquaintanceship ties 
 
Next, friendship ties and acquaintanceship ties were included in a model as independent 
variables, and the effects of crime rates and social ties on social participation were examined 
(Table 4-3). 
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Table 4-3. Effects of crime rates and social ties on social participation 
 
 
Table 4-3 shows that both friendship ties and acquaintanceship ties exert a positive 
influence on social participation. Combined with the results of Table 4-2, neighborhood-level 
crime affects social participation through the following two distinct pathways: 1) a “promoting 
path”, in which burglary indirectly promotes social participation by increasing friendship ties, and 
2) an “inhibitory path”, in which burglary indirectly suppresses social participation by decreasing 
Independent Variables Coefficient
Individual-level Variables
Intercept 0.05
Sex (male = 1, female = 0) -0.16 **
Duration of residency 0.01 ***
Annual household income 0.01
Educational background 0.04
Musashino City (dummy) 0.02
Trust 0.11 *
Reciprocity 0.11 *
Fear of crime 0.01
Friendship ties 0.09 ***
Acquaintance ties 0.09 ***
Neighborhood-level Variables
2008 Larceny on burglary 0.14
2008 Larceny on non-burglary -0.03 *
Individual × Neighborhood
Trust × Burglary -0.02
Trust × Non-burglary 0.01 *
Random Effect
Variance
Component
Intercept 0.01
Individual-Level n 407
Neighborhood-Level n 43
Model 3
Social participation
Note: ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, †p<.10
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acquaintanceship ties. Moreover, the number of larcenies not associated with property break-ins 
directly reduced social participation. As Table 4-3 shows, however, the inhibiting effect of these 
crimes on social participation was buffered by the respondents’ generalized trust. Figure 4-3 
shows the cross-level interaction effect of larceny (other forms of theft) and trust on social 
participation. 
 
 
Figure 4-3. Cross-level interaction effect of larceny (other forms of theft) and trust on social 
participation 
 
 Figure 4-4 summarizes the results (main effects only). 
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Figure 4-4. Summary of the effects of crime rates on social participation 
 
Discussion 
 The present study’s results showed that in neighborhoods with high larceny rates 
(property break-ins), people tended to have more friendship ties but fewer acquaintanceship ties. 
Model 3 in Table 4-3 showed that these two types of social ties had significant facilitation effects 
on social participation. Thus, this type of crime indirectly facilitates social participation by 
enhancing residents’ friendship ties while indirectly lowering their social participation by 
weakening acquaintanceship ties. These results may help to explain the inconsistencies in findings 
from previous empirical research. In addition, larceny involving other types of theft (e.g., pick-
pocketing and purse-snatching) indicated a direct inhibitory effect on social participation, as Table 
4-3 shows. 
 The finding that crime facilitates people’s participation by increasing intimate social ties 
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is consistent with the findings of Taylor (1996), Berkowitz (2000), and Wandersman and Florin 
(2000), which showed that crime draws residents closer together and stimulates their social 
participation as a means of coping with external threats. The finding that crime directly and 
indirectly reduces social participation by reducing weak social ties is consistent with the findings 
of Skogan (1990) and Saegert and Winkel (2004), which showed that crime encourages people to 
withdraw socially from their neighborhood and disrupts the neighborhood’s ability to organize. 
 An additional interesting finding of this study is the interaction effects of neighborhood 
crime and individual generalized trust. As Figure 4-2 shows, the effect of generalized trust on the 
number of acquaintanceship ties is larger for neighborhoods with higher crime rates. Similarly, 
Figure 4-3 suggests that the effect of generalized trust on social participation is stronger for 
neighborhoods with higher crime rates. In other words, these results suggest that the importance 
of generalized trust increases in neighborhoods with high crime rates. Because of the high social 
uncertainty induced by crime, people need generalized trust to connect with unfamiliar people. 
Thus, people with low generalized trust are only able to form tight and close networks in response 
to a rise in crime because they constrict their open networks as an antidote to crime. These results 
suggest that people who have low generalized trust abandon relationships with unfamiliar people 
and restrict their networks to those with whom they are familiar. Some researchers have noted the 
spread of gated communities in the U.S. as an example of a change in the community structure 
118 
 
arising in response to the fear of crime (Blakely & Snyder, 1999; Low, 2003). Although the 
physical enclosure of communities (e.g., gated communities) has not become common in Japan 
despite the spread of apartments with automatically lockable doors, people can maintain “gated 
relationships” in response to the need for a psychological sense of security. This may lead to 
constricted social relationships. Closed and exclusive networks are undesirable because they 
restrict people’s opportunities to gain the benefit of a diversity of networks. 
 Some limitations of the present study should be noted. First, the survey response rate 
was low (Musashino: 33.6%, Kiyose: 30.6%); however, mail surveys in Japan have been found 
to have relatively low response rates, typically no higher than 20-40% (Harada, Waki, & Mizutani, 
2001; Sakurai & Jacobson, 2010). Thus, the present study’s response rate was comparable to, if 
not better than, typical community-based surveys of this type conducted in Japan. Nevertheless, 
the possibility that the present study’s results may be biased by the low response rate should be 
acknowledged. For example, in the present study’s dataset, the proportion of young respondents 
(20-29 years old) was considerably lower than the proportion of participants in the older age 
groups. Therefore, the present study’s samples included an artificially high number of 
homemakers and retirees, who are more likely to have social ties in the neighborhood than people 
in other social groups. 
 Second, although the present study used crime data from one year prior to the survey, 
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the other data were cross-sectional. Additionally, it is unclear whether crime data of a year ago 
are appropriate for examining the effect of crime on neighborhood social ties, and this study 
cannot reject the possibility of reverse causation. The present study’s results must be replicated 
with longitudinal samples. 
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Study 6: What Does Surveillance Provide for Society? The Influences of Security Cameras 
in Public Spaces on Neighborhood Cohesion and Trust 
 
Introduction 
One of the effects of crime on society is that it changes communities. For example, it 
has been noted that gated communities have become widespread in the U.S. in response to the 
deterioration of public safety (Blakely & Snyder, 1999; Low, 2003). Study 5 described the 
possibilities of an increase in friendship ties and a decrease in acquaintanceship ties in response 
to the crime rate as one aspect of the crime-induced changes in community-dwelling residents’ 
psychological and social contexts. One social consequence implied by the results is that closed 
and exclusive personal relationships are formed in response to crime. Study 6 focuses on an 
additional aspect of the social changes caused by crime, i.e., the surveillance society. The present 
study examined security cameras as an example of the surveillance society and investigated how 
neighborhood surveillance has led to changes in social relationships. One context of this study is 
the phenomenon of “crime prevention community design” (bouhan machizukuri in Japanese), 
which is a recent social reaction to crime. 
Recently, the installation of security cameras in public spaces as an anti-crime measure 
has increased worldwide (Welsh & Farrington, 2009). In the U.K., where the installation of 
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security cameras was promoted early across the country, cameras have been installed in many 
public spaces, such as city centers, shopping malls, parking lots, and workplaces, and citizens 
have exhibited largely positive attitudes toward them (Gill, Bryan, & Allen, 2007). However, 
citizens’ attitudes toward the installation of cameras in residential areas have not been as deeply 
investigated. 
In Japan, security cameras in public spaces are becoming popular because of societal 
demands for such measures as antiterrorism protection for busy streets and public transportation 
systems, countermeasures against purse-snatching and auto theft, and the prevention of the 
victimization of children in public spaces, including streets and parks (Shimada, 2012). One of 
Japan’s major street security camera installation projects (more precisely, closed circuit television 
or CCTV) was conducted in Ichikawa City, Chiba Prefecture (Amemiya, Shimada, & Takagi, 
2011), where the municipal government installed 150 CCTV cameras in the city’s stations, school 
roads and parks between 2008 and 2009. Although many CCTV installation projects are 
conducted around stations and busy streets, the project in Ichikawa City was characterized by the 
installation of CCTV cameras in common living spaces, such as school roads and residential zones. 
In addition, although installations of surveillance cameras in relatively private spaces, such as 
apartment buildings and workplaces, have become commonplace, the present study focused on 
surveillance cameras installed in more public spaces, i.e., public streets and parks in 
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neighborhoods. As represented by the Ichikawa project, anticrime policies, including surveillance, 
are becoming increasingly popular in the context of the crime prevention community design in 
Japan. 
However, many criticisms of this type of crime prevention community design have been 
raised (Amemiya, Hino, Kojima, & Yokohari, 2007). For example, from the perspective of the 
surveillance society, Hamai and Serizawa (2006) argued that if the crime prevention community 
design is overpromoted, society will be shaped by certain exclusionary values that will prevent 
many socially vulnerable individuals from being part of society. This will create an environment 
in which such individuals are considered “suspicious people” and are aggressively excluded from 
the city. Abe and Narumi (2006) argued that residential neighborhoods with excessive crime 
prevention capabilities tend to close off the people living within the community from the outside. 
In Western countries, neighborhood surveillance measures are likely to result from citizens’ 
perceptions that the police and criminal justice systems have failed to reduce crime and to 
maintain social order. By contrast, in Japan, there is the perception that neighborhood surveillance 
is motivated by reductions in citizens’ social norms and the attenuation of human relationships 
(Ogino, 2006). Thus, introducing surveillance into neighborhoods can be considered a success of 
the local community inWestern countries (i.e., the result of citizens’ collective efforts), whereas 
neighborhood surveillance in Japan can be viewed as the result of an unsuccessful local society. 
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In addition, Lyon (2001) suggested that surveillance increases suspicion in neighborhoods and 
threatens the social cohesion that represents the affluence of residents’ social ties and solidarity. 
For example, surveillance through CCTV cameras can be viewed as a sign of low cohesion among 
residents, i.e., people may believe that “camera surveillance is conducted because residents’ social 
cohesion is low in this neighborhood.” 
Conversely, the surveillance function can enhance a type of social trust that corresponds 
to “assurance” (anshin) in Yamagishi’s (1998) theory of trust. The concept of assurance is the 
expectation that other people will behave cooperatively without social uncertainty. Thus, social 
uncertainty is reduced by surveillance because people can assume that others will not do wrong 
because they are being monitored, meaning that people can “trust” one another. 
In summary, surveillance seems to have two contradictory effects, lowering the 
perception of neighborhood social cohesion and increasing residents’ trust in others. The purpose 
of this study was to investigate the relationships between exposure to CCTV cameras and 
perceived social cohesion and trust using survey data from Ichikawa City to reveal the impact that 
surveillance has on society. 
Incidentally, although we can view the installation of CCTV cameras in Ichikawa City 
as a type of social experiment, exposure to CCTV cameras was poorly randomized for a social 
experiment, i.e., this project was not a randomized controlled trial (RCT). Therefore, there may 
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be selection biases and unobserved confounders in the relationship between exposure to CCTV 
cameras and perceived cohesion/trust, such that the validation of the causal relationship is 
threatened. Thus, this study examined the adequacy of the causal relationship using an 
instrumental variables (IV) method. 
The IV method uses instrumental variables that are not directly associated with the 
outcomes (more precisely, error terms of outcomes) but are correlated with the independent 
variables. This is synonymous with using variables corresponding to a “coin toss.” For example, 
if we can assign participants to an “exposure to CCTV cameras group” and a “non-exposure group” 
using coin tosses, we can detect the “pure” effect of CCTV cameras on neighborhood cohesion 
and trust as though an RCT had been conducted (Figure 4-5). Identifying the instrumental 
variables that correspond to the “coin toss” in the dataset is an important step in studies that use 
the IV method. 
 
 
Figure 4-5. A schematic of the IV method 
 
Exposure to 
CCTV
Evaluation of 
neighborhood cohesion/
Trust in others
Result of coin 
tosses
The results of coin tosses do 
not have any relationship with 
perception about neighborhood 
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 No studies, including the current study, have conducted an RCT to examine the effect 
of exposure to CCTV cameras on residents’ perceptions of their neighborhoods. The next best 
option is to identify instrumental variables and observe changes in the dependent variable 
associated with quasi-experimental variations in the independent variables (Ichida et al., 2013; 
Kawachi, Ichida, Tampubolon, & Fujiwara, 2013). The instrumental variables used in this study 
are explained in the Methods section. 
The final goal of this study was to reveal both the positive and negative aspects of 
security cameras and discuss their anticipated social consequences. 
 
Methods 
Data 
In 2010, investigators for the National Research Institute of Police Science (NRIPS) 
mailed a survey to 2,632 residents aged 20-74 years living in Ichikawa City, Chiba Prefecture. 
Ichikawa City is located in northwestern Chiba Prefecture, has a population of approximately 
470,000 and is a bedroom suburb of the Tokyo Metropolitan Area (according to census figures in 
2010, the percentage of people who commuted from Ichikawa City to one of Tokyo’s 23 wards 
was 46.5%). As previously mentioned, Ichikawa City is an advanced area where the municipality-
led installation of surveillance cameras in common spaces has been conducted in areas other than 
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the fronts of stations and busy downtown streets. Therefore, at the moment, this area can be 
referred to as the most suitable place for a social experiment on the effects of surveillance on 
neighborhoods. 
The present survey was the third wave of a series of mail surveys conducted since 2007 
by NRIPS and the Ichikawa City government (Shimada, 2013). In the first survey wave, which 
was conducted in November 2007, a questionnaire was mailed to 2,000 (40 neighborhoods × 50 
people) residents of Ichikawa City, who were selected using two-stage random sampling from the 
Basic Resident Resister. The neighborhood unit was the choumoku, and the response rate was 
59.2% (n = 1,184). In the second wave survey, which was conducted in February 2010, a survey 
was mailed to 983 respondents of the first wave survey and 3,090 residents newly sampled from 
the Basic Resident Register. The response rate of the second wave was 58.7% (n = 2,392). In the 
third wave survey, which was conducted in February 2012, a questionnaire was mailed to 2,332 
residents who were respondents of the first or second surveys, plus 300 residents newly sampled 
from the Basic Resident Register. The response rate was 75.9% (n = 1,998) 
This study used data from the third wave survey. The number of observations used in 
the analyses was reduced to 647 because there were several versions of the questionnaire and the 
current study only used data from respondents who responded to questionnaires that included 
items about perceived social cohesion and trust in others. 
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Measurements 
Perceived neighborhood social cohesion and trust in others were measured as outcome 
variables. Perceived social cohesion was measured with the following item: “Residents of this 
neighborhood do not know each other well.” The responses were captured on a 4-point Likert 
scale (1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Agree, 4 = Strongly agree). In the analyses, the 
score of this variable was reversed – i.e., high scores for this item represent high estimates of 
neighborhood cohesion. Trust in others was measured with the following item: “Most people can 
be trusted.” Responses were arranged on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = 
Disagree, 3= Neither, 4 = Agree, 5 = Strongly agree). 
Exposure to CCTV cameras, the exposure variable of this study, was measured by 
asking the respondents the following question: “The Ichikawa City government installed 152 
CCTV cameras in parks and roads of the city between 2009 and 2011. Were you aware of this?” 
The respondents were asked to mark one response from 3 categories (1 = I was not aware of this, 
2 = I was aware, but I have not actually seen the CCTV cameras, 3 = I actually saw the CCTV 
cameras). To examine the effect of “actual exposure” to CCTV cameras on perceived 
cohesion/trust, respondents who reported that they saw CCTV cameras in the city were coded as 
1, and the other respondents were coded as 0. 
This study included respondents’ sex, age, annual household income, and fear of crime 
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as individual-level covariates. Fear of crime was assessed by asking about each respondent’s fear 
of “burglary,” “vandalism to cars or houses,” “auto or bike theft/car break-ins,” “street crimes” 
and “life-threatening crimes.” Responses were arranged on a 4-point Likert scale (1 = Not anxious 
at all, 2 = Somewhat anxious, 3 = Anxious, 4 = Highly anxious). In the analysis, the average of 
these five items was used. The number of street crimes and burglaries in 2011, population density 
per km2 in 2011, and the presence of CCTV cameras in each neighborhood (choumoku) were 
included as neighborhood-level covariates. The numbers of crimes were translated into the crime 
rates per 1,000 people. In the analyses, the crime rates and population density were transformed 
into logarithms. For the variable of the presence of CCTV cameras, the neighborhoods where 
CCTV cameras were installed were coded as 1, and the other neighborhoods were coded as 0. 
This study used two instrumental variables that correlated with the exposure variable 
but not the outcome variables, as follows: perceptions of volunteer patrols and the blue light patrol 
cars in the city. The current study adopted these two instrumental variables for the following 
reasons. First, these variables were thought to be associated with the independent variable (i.e., 
exposure to CCTV). Crime prevention strategies that are exercised in a neighborhood are not 
conducted at spatially random locations; rather, they are spatially overlapped. That is, although 
there is a possibility of the existence of other confounders, people who are exposed to a certain 
anticrime activity (e.g., volunteer patrols and the blue light patrol cars) are also likely to be 
129 
 
exposed to CCTV cameras. Second, these instrumental variables are not assumed to be related to 
the dependent variable. Because volunteer patrols and the blue light patrol cars are relatively less 
likely to include features of surveillance and have a smaller impact than CCTV cameras, their 
association with the dependent variables (i.e., respondents’ perception of neighborhood cohesion 
and trust in others) is considered to be weak. The respondents were asked the following question 
about the perception of volunteer patrols: “Ichikawa City government is implementing volunteer 
patrols by asking citizens to conduct patrols as they jog or walk, with a formal cap provided by 
the government. Were you aware of this?” The respondents chose one of the 4 predetermined 
categories (1 = I was not aware of this, 2 = I was aware, but have not actually seen the patrols, 3 
= I saw people wearing the caps, 4 = I have participated in these activities). The respondents who 
chose 2, 3, and 4 were coded as 1, and those who chose 1 were coded as 0. Residents’ perceptions 
of the blue light patrol cars were obtained from responses to the following question: “In Ichikawa 
City, the blue light patrol cars are patrolling the whole city. Were you aware of this?” The 
respondents were asked to mark one response from 4 categories (1 = I was not aware of this, 2 = 
I was aware, but I have not actually seen the cars, 3 = I have seen the cars once, 4 = I have seen 
the cars two or more times). Respondents who chose 2, 3, and 4 were coded as 1, and those who 
chose 1 were coded as 0. 
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Statistical analyses 
The IV method was conducted through a two-stage least-square (2SLS) test. In the first 
stage, the following model was analyzed: 
Other Predictor 
where  is a predicted value of the exposure variable (exposure to CCTV cameras) and  and 
 represent the instrumental variables (  = perception of the volunteer patrols,  = 
perception of the blue light patrol cars). 
In the second stage, , the predicted value of exposure to CCTV cameras, was 
included in the regression equations as an explanatory variable that explains the outcome variables 
(e.g., perception of cohesion). 
Other Predictor  
where  is the perception of cohesion and  represents the “pure” effect of exposure to 
CCTV cameras. The same model was also applied to the analysis of trust in others. 
Because the exposure variable, exposure to CCTV cameras, was binary in this study, the 
first-stage model was estimated using a probit model. For these analyses, the treatreg command 
in STATA was used. 
 The analyses targeted 647 respondents who were sampled from 39 neighborhoods 
(chomoku) and responded to the questionnaire versions that included items about social cohesion 
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and trust. However, respondents with missing values were omitted using the list-wise case 
deletion in each analysis. Thus, the numbers of observations used in the analyses differed between 
models. 
Because respondents living in the same neighborhood may have high intra-class 
correlations, the variance between observations is likely to be underestimated. Guided by previous 
studies (Inamasu & Ikeda, 2009; Rogers, 1994), the current study clustered respondents who lived 
in the same neighborhood and calculated robust standard errors by weighting the matrix 
calculations for standard errors of regression coefficients under the assumption that there is a 
certain level of intra-class correlation within the clusters but that clusters are independent from 
each other. 
To examine whether appropriate instrumental variables were used in the analyses, (1) 
the association, (2) endogeneity of the exposure variable, and (3) lack of correlation between the 
instrumental variables and an error term of the outcome variable were checked. For the association, 
the correlation of the instrumental variables (in this study, perception of volunteer patrols and the 
blue light patrol cars) with the exposure variable was tested. The endogeneity of an exposure 
variable was checked by testing whether perceived CCTV cameras (used as the exposure variable) 
was an endogenous variable. For the lack of correlation between instrumental variables and an 
error term of the outcome variable, this study tested whether the instrumental variables met the 
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IV method’s major premise that instrumental variables are correlated with the exposure variable 
but are not correlated with the error term of the outcome variable. This study examined the 
appropriateness of the instrumental variables used in the study through the above three tests. 
 
Results 
 Table 4-4 presents the descriptive statistics of this study. 
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Table 4-4. Descriptive statistics of Study 6 
 
 
 Table 4-4 shows that 60% of respondents had seen the CCTV cameras in the city. 
Whereas the percentage of respondents who were unaware of the volunteer patrols by local 
Items Mean SD Items %
Perception of social cohesion
(4-point scale)
2.75 0.84 Sex
Male 42.0
Trust in others (5-point scale) 3.00 0.84 Female 58.0
Fear of crime (4-point scale) (α = 0.93) Perception of CCTV cameras
Burglary 2.55 0.90
Vandalisms to cars or houses 2.33 0.86
auto or bike theft/car break-in 2.32 0.88
Street crimes 2.53 0.91 "I had actually seen the CCTV cameras" 60.0
Life-threatening crimes 2.54 1.06
Mean 2.45 0.82 Perception of volunteer patrols
Neighborhood crime rates (per 1,000 people)
Street crime 10.87 7.92
Burglary 5.23 4.22
"I had not known that" 57.2
Perception of blue light patrol cars
"I had not known that" 15.8
Age
20-29 years old 3.7
30-39 years old 15.3
40-49 years old 24.7
50-59 years old 23.0
60 or older 33.2
Annual household income
Less than 3 million yen 21.5
3-6 million yen 38.3
6-9 million yen 25.5
More than 9 million yen 14.7
Presence of CCTV in neighborhoods
Neighborhood where CCTV cameras exist 35.7
"I had known that, but I had not actually
seen that", "I had seen that one time" or "I
had seen that more than two times"
40.0
42.8
84.2
Neighborhood where CCTV cameras do
not exist
64.3
"I had not known that" or "I had known
that, but I had not actually seen CCTV
cameras"
"I had known that, but I had not actually
seen that", "I had seen those people
wearing the cap" or "I had participated in
those activities"
Neighborhood population density
(per km
2
)
14504.69 6492.38
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residents was approximately 60%, only 15% were unaware of the blue light patrol cars.  
Table 4-5 contains the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) (Model 1) and 2SLS (Model 2 and 
3) estimations for the effect of exposure to CCTV cameras on perceived social cohesion. 
 
Table 4-5. OLS and 2SLS estimations of the effect of exposure to CCTV cameras on perceived 
social cohesion 
 
 
Dependent variables:
Coefficient
Robust
std. error
Coefficient
Robust
std. error
Coefficient
Robust
std. error
-0.333 ** (0.082)
-0.825 * (0.321)
0.562 ** (0.108)
0.422 ** (0.158)
Male 0.094 (0.075) 0.062 (0.107) 0.100 (0.072)
Female Reference Reference Reference
20-29 0.399 † (0.221) 0.010 (0.286) 0.400 † (0.242)
30-39 0.268 † (0.151) 0.021 (0.171) 0.269 † (0.149)
40-49 0.246 † (0.129) 0.254 † (0.148) 0.299 * (0.132)
50-59 0.252 * (0.093) 0.261 † (0.150) 0.293 ** (0.097)
60 or older Reference Reference Reference
Less than 3 million yen -0.236 † (0.125) 0.172 (0.192) -0.197 (0.130)
3-6 million yen -0.097 (0.118) 0.242 (0.167) -0.038 (0.123)
6-9 million yen 0.063 (0.108) 0.151 (0.172) 0.104 (0.105)
More than 9 million yen Reference Reference Reference
0.010 (0.049) -0.137 * (0.067) -0.017 (0.056)
0.534 † (0.308) -0.038 (0.551) 0.432 (0.331)
-0.384 (0.253) -0.160 (0.435) -0.333 (0.271)
0.208 † (0.116) -0.003 (0.102) 0.215 † (0.129)
-0.043 (0.089) 0.206 † (0.113) -0.011 (0.084)
-1.986 † (1.096) -0.481 (1.068) -1.810 (1.229)
629 629 629
39 39 39
.107 .054
.042
Perception of CCTV predicted by IV
Partial R
2
Age
Annual household income
Fear of crime
Burglary crime rate (log)
Street crime rate (log)
Population density (log)
Presence of CCTV cameras
Constant
Observations
Clusters
Adjusted R
2
** p <.01, * p <.05, † p <.10
Model 3
OLS
2SLS 2SLS
1st stage (Probit model) 2nd stage
Sex
Perception of blue light patrol cars
Perception of volunteer patrols
Model 1 Model 2
Social cohesion Perception of CCTV Social cohesion
Perception of CCTV
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 Model 1 (OLS estimations) in Table 4-5 shows that the exposure to CCTV cameras was 
negatively associated with perceived social cohesion (coefficient = -0.333, p<.01). In Model 2, 
the first stage of 2SLS, exposure to CCTV cameras was predicted by the instrumental variables 
of perceived volunteer patrols and the blue light patrol cars. Both instrumental variables were 
positively related to exposure to CCTV cameras. In Model 3, the second stage of 2SLS, the 
predicted value of exposure to CCTV cameras that was calculated in Model 2 was included as an 
independent variable and its association with perceived social cohesion was estimated. The 
instrumented exposure to CCTV cameras showed a negative effect on perceived social cohesion 
(coefficient = -0.825, p<.05). Based on the results, it is suggested that the IV method detected 
stronger associations than those estimated by OLS for the relationship between CCTV cameras 
and perceived social cohesion. 
Table 4-6 shows the effect of exposure to CCTV cameras on trust in others as estimated 
with the same analytical framework as Table 4-5. 
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Table 4-6. OLS and 2SLS estimations of the effect of exposure to CCTV on trust in others 
 
 
 The OLS analysis (Model 1 in Table 4-6) shows that the exposure to CCTV cameras 
was not correlated with trust (coefficient = 0.054, n.s.). By contrast, Model 3 in Table 4-6, which 
includes the predicted value of the exposure to CCTV as estimated by instrumental variables, 
shows that exposure to CCTV cameras was positively associated with trust in others (coefficient 
= 0.631, p<.01). 
Dependent variables:
Coefficient
Robust
std. error
Coefficient
Robust
std. error
Coefficient
Robust
std. error
0.054 (0.078)
0.631 ** (0.235)
0.561 ** (0.107)
0.405 ** (0.155)
Male 0.018 (0.079) 0.032 (0.106) 0.014 (0.082)
Female Reference Reference Reference
20-29 -0.979 ** (0.202) 0.017 (0.285) -0.983 ** (0.203)
30-39 -0.502 ** (0.121) 0.048 (0.168) -0.507 ** (0.118)
40-49 -0.365 ** (0.108) 0.247 † (0.146) -0.429 ** (0.103)
50-59 -0.221 † (0.113) 0.262 † (0.147) -0.270 * (0.110)
60 or older Reference Reference Reference
Less than 3 million yen -0.178 (0.144) 0.146 (0.188) -0.220 (0.155)
3-6 million yen 0.027 (0.124) 0.266 (0.166) -0.047 (0.129)
6-9 million yen 0.072 (0.135) 0.169 (0.171) 0.020 (0.146)
More than 9 million yen Reference Reference Reference
-0.133 * (0.056) -0.137 * (0.065) -0.101 † (0.060)
-0.110 (0.262) -0.185 (0.553) 0.028 (0.276)
0.100 (0.224) -0.047 (0.435) 0.026 (0.244)
0.118 * (0.049) 0.012 (0.100) 0.106 † (0.057)
0.032 (0.082) 0.174 (0.112) 0.000 (0.085)
-0.521 (0.522) -0.611 (1.046) -0.693 (0.629)
647 647 647
39 39 39
.084 .082
.043
Perception of CCTV predicted by IV
Partial R
2
Age
Annual household income
Fear of crime
Burglary crime rate (log)
Street crime rate (log)
Population density (log)
Presence of CCTV cameras
Constant
Observations
Clusters
Adjusted R
2
** p <.01, * p <.05, † p <.10
Model 3
OLS
2SLS 2SLS
1st stage (Probit model) 2nd stage
Sex
Perception of volunteer patrols
Perception of blue light patrol cars
Model 1 Model 2
Trust in others Perception of CCTV Trust in others
Perception of CCTV
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To test whether the instrumental variables that were used in this study were appropriate, 
several posttests were conducted. Concerning the association between instrumental variables and 
the exposure variable, F statistics of 2SLS’s first stage can be used. The F statistics were 38.36 
for the analysis on social cohesion and 30.79 for the analysis on trust. Because these values are 
sufficiently higher than the recommended threshold value of 10 (Staiger & Stock, 1997), the 
instrumental variables that were used in this study were not “weak instrumental variables” 
(Angrist & Pischke, 2008) – i.e., the present study’s instrumental variables had 
appropriate associations with the dependent variables. 
 Second, concerning the endogeneity of exposure to CCTV, Durbin-Wu-Hausman’s F 
statistics for the endogeneity of the regressor in the 2SLS second stage (i.e., the exposure to CCTV 
cameras) were 4.12 (p<.05) for the analysis of social cohesion and 4.19 (p<.05) for the analysis 
of trust. Thus, the null hypothesis (H0 = “the exposure to CCTV cameras is exogenous”) was 
rejected for both models. Thus, the exposure to CCTV cameras was endogenous and the use of 
instrumental variables was appropriate. 
 Finally, a joint null hypothesis (i.e., instrumental variables are not correlated with the 
error term of the outcome and the models are correctly identified) was checked by the Sargan test. 
The Sargan χ2 statistics were 1.97 (n.s.) for the analysis of cohesion and 2.15 (n.s.) for the analysis 
of trust. Because the null hypothesis was not rejected, this study concluded that the instrumental 
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variables were not correlated with the error term of the outcome and that the models were correctly 
identified. 
 
Discussion 
 The IV analysis results showed that people who were exposed to CCTV cameras in 
neighborhoods underestimated neighborhood social cohesion. The effect of instrumented CCTV 
exposure (“predicted exposure to CCTV cameras,” excluding endogeneity) was twice as strong 
as that estimated by OLS. This result suggests that “pure” exposure to CCTV cameras, excluding 
the influences of selection biases and unobserved confounders, is quite strongly associated with 
perceived neighborhood social cohesion. In the short term, people who observed the “surveillance” 
conducted in the neighborhood may have believed that the residents’ cohesion was low and, 
consequently, may have underestimated the neighborhood’s social cohesion. In future studies, a 
question concerning whether CCTV cameras have longer-term impacts on neighborhoods – i.e., 
whether CCTV cameras disturb the development of neighborhood cohesion – should be examined. 
For example, as a longitudinal mechanism, in a situation in which CCTV surveillance is effective, 
the need for and importance of residents’ “natural surveillance” may be reduced and the 
significance of neighborhood cohesion may also be relatively lowered. In neighborhoods where 
residents’ cohesion is high, strangers can easily be identified and natural surveillance by residents 
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can function with little additional effort (Sampson et al., 1997), whereas CCTV cameras assume 
these monitoring functions in the neighborhoods. Sustained resident surveillance (“eyes on the 
street”) built on social capital among neighbors (Jacobs, 1961) can be taken over by machines 
(the term “electronic eyes of social capital” (Uveda, Donadello, Gasparin, & Macke, 2011) has 
emerged to describe this function). In such a situation, it may be difficult to develop social 
cohesion. Additionally, the social cohesion question item that was used in the current study 
(“Residents of this neighborhood do not know each other well”) may capture residents’ 
neighborhood mobility. Namely, the negative relationship between exposure to CCTV cameras 
and perception of low social cohesion may reflect a consequence that people who observed CCTV 
cameras thought that “residential stability may be low in this neighborhood.” In neighborhoods 
where the mobility of residents is high and, thus, stability is low, residents have difficulties 
exerting informal social controls and camera surveillances are likely to be required. If ignorance 
about neighborhood residents represents high residential mobility and low residential stability, in 
such neighborhoods the formation of social networks may be disturbed, local society may be 
disorganized, and the crime prevention functions may be decreased. In this regard, future research 
should examine whether CCTV cameras will enhance the perception of neighborhood residential 
instability in the long run. 
On the other hand, respondents who were exposed to CCTV cameras reported high trust 
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in others. The effect of CCTV cameras on trust, as estimated by OLS, was small and non-
significant, whereas instrumented exposure to CCTV cameras showed a positive significant effect. 
The finding that CCTV cameras increase people’s social trust is identical to the mechanism of the 
formation of “assurance” in generalized trust theory. Because this type of trust is expected to 
produce positive effects on people’s health and safety (Kawachi, Takao, & Subramanian, 2013), 
the association between CCTV exposure and trust may be viewed as a positive effect of 
surveillance. 
 The important point of the present study’s findings is that camera surveillance had a 
seemingly imbalanced effect whereby it both decreased social cohesion and increased trust 
(assurance) in others. For an extreme example, in a society where crime is perfectly controlled by 
surveillance, people can secure their “assurance” due to the absolute surveillance; however, 
connections between people may be reduced. We assume that such a society pays a hefty price 
for its reassurance (e.g., the monetary cost of surveillance, deteriorated social relationships, and 
lower innovation due to decreased diversity or openness in people’s social ties). This situation is 
in opposition to the present study’s idea of treating crime prevention as a by-product of social 
capital. Future studies should investigate whether CCTV cameras and other types of surveillance 
obstruct the development of cohesion rather than securing assurances and whether “human eyes” 
will be replaced by “electronic eyes” as a social consequence of the present study’s findings. In 
141 
 
addition, a unique phenomenon of contemporary society is that electronic machines are replacing 
the surveillance (and subsequent sanction) that has been traditionally exerted by local residents. 
This situation might be associated with a second-order dilemma that questions who should incur 
the costs of system maintenance. In this respect, surveillance may be detrimental to society. 
 If the installation processes of CCTV cameras (e.g., decision making regarding 
installation sites) are spearheaded by residents in a democratic fashion, there is a possibility that 
residents may believe that “residents of this neighborhood are cohesive because they can 
cooperatively introduce CCTV cameras” and estimate neighborhood cohesion as high. 
Conversely, if CCTV cameras are “coercively” introduced to society through a government 
initiative, they may be viewed as monitoring by the state (or okami, the nominal designation for 
government in Japan when emphasizing its paternalism), possibly causing a reduction in 
perceived neighborhood cohesion. Although neighborhood associations (outwardly) determined 
the CCTV installation sites in Ichikawa City in a democratic manner, few respondents were aware 
of this (based on a question that asked whether respondents were aware that installation sites were 
determined by requests from neighborhood associations – only 7% of respondents responded 
positively). This result implies that many residents believe that the installation project was led by 
the government. The “adverse effect” of CCTV cameras on society may be moderated by the 
artifice of contriving the installation process. 
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 The limitations of this study should be noted. The trust question that was used in the 
survey cannot distinguish whether the trust that was enhanced by CCTV cameras was “assurance” 
or a different type of trust (e.g., generalized trust). As Grootaert and Bastelaer (2002) and Tsuji 
and Harihara(2002) noted, the trust measured in the current study may be the particularized trust 
in “local residents.” For example, Stugis and Smith (2010) reported that immediately after 
answering the generalized trust question, if respondents were asked to report who came to mind 
when they formulated their response, a substantial number of respondents reported that they 
thought about people whom they knew personally. Furthermore, respondents who called 
personally well-known persons to mind showed higher levels of trust than those who called 
“people in general” to mind (Stugis & Smith, 2010). In the present study, the feeling that was 
increased by “surveillance” was theoretically considered to be “assurance.” From this perspective, 
a concept that is similar to particularized trust such as “trust in local residents” may fit more 
comfortably into the present study’s analytic models than generalized trust. However, the 
possibility that the concept that was measured here and the concept that was theoretically inferred 
differed should be noted as one of the present study’s limitations. 
 In conclusion, this study demonstrates the potential causal association between CCTV 
cameras and perceptions of communal society; that is, camera surveillance had a positive effect 
on trust in others and a negative effect on perceived social cohesion. The results suggest the 
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importance of implementing social policies with consideration for their potential adverse effects. 
The analytical method that was used in this study is also useful for other intervention studies. For 
example, when examining whether residents’ participation in voluntary anticrime activities 
increases social capital, reverse causality is possible such that affluence in social capital facilitates 
people’s participation. The IV method can effectively estimate the effect of this “social 
experience”. 
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General Discussion 
A question that has been posed throughout this dissertation is whether social capital, the 
softer aspect of neighborhood environment than the existing anticrime town development, is 
effective for crime prevention in Japan. Although statements that “social capital is useful for crime 
prevention” have been frequently mentioned in the context of crime prevention in Japan, they 
remain in anecdotal stories. In addition, few studies have examined the crime prevention effects 
of social capital using advanced statistical methods such as multilevel models and spatial analytic 
techniques even though these analytic methods have been essential in the fields of criminology, 
public health, and epidemiology in Western countries. 
Then, does the current dissertation provide an answer to the above question? The answer 
is “yes.” Study 1 showed that neighborhood management activities that were facilitated by social 
capital but apparently unrelated to crime prevention had a crime reduction effect. Study 3 
demonstrated the direct effect of neighborhood social capital on larceny victimization using 
multiple geographic definitions of neighborhood. In addition, Study 4 detected the inhibitory 
effect of neighbors’ trust on crime both in the model mediated by informal and formal social 
controls and the model mediated by neighborhood management activities. Multiple models were 
examined to clarify the effects of social capital indices on crime in this dissertation. The models 
demonstrated that placing social capital at the starting point of the models was effective. 
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Especially, as Studies 1 and 4 demonstrated, the significant inhibitory effects of behaviors that 
are not directly associated with crime preventions, such as neighborhood management activities 
(e.g., cleanup activity), on crime victimization are interesting and important. Namely, this type of 
crime prevention effect can cover the shortcomings of the recent crime prevention community 
design – i.e., fortification and exclusionism of the community and the budgetary restrictions of 
the municipalities. That is, if activities that are seemingly unrelated to crime can be diverted to 
crime prevention, we can aim for a society that differs from the “fortified society.” 
Additionally, one strong point in diverting social capital to the crime prevention models 
is that we can introduce the economic concepts of externality and (intentional and unintentional) 
investment in neighborhood to traditional criminological models. This point was glaringly 
apparent in the findings of Study 1 – i.e., respondents’ own cooperative behaviors did not have a 
crime prevention effect but their neighbors’ cooperative behaviors had an effect. These results 
represented the spillover effect of social capital in that even residents who do not invest in the 
neighborhood can enjoy the positive effects of neighbors’ social capital. Because the 
externality/spillover effect can provide benefits for vulnerable residents who cannot devote their 
resources to the neighborhood (e.g., the poor people, older people etc.), it has a favorable aspect 
for society. On the other hand, based on the assumption that the nature of externality/spillover can 
be a source of free-riding, Study 2 focused on the social dilemmatic features of neighborhood 
147 
 
collective anticrime activities. In Japan, the fear of crime and the actual crime victimization that 
occurs in neighborhoods have been mentioned as the primal motivations to start collective 
anticrime activities. However, it has been noted that the motivations to maintain these activities 
are social solidarity and public spirit (Ogino, 2006). However, these hypotheses have remained at 
anecdotal discourses and have not been empirically demonstrated. Study 2 empirically revealed 
that the reduction of cost is important for the maintenance of collective anticrime activities and 
that neighborhood social capital reduces the cost. 
The features of social capital examined in this dissertation fit well with current criminal 
policy. Current criminal policy in Japan is shifting the idea from “crime control through an 
increase in arrest rate” to “crime control through crime prevention” due to the reduced arrest rate 
and relatively decreased police forces. If the number of neighborhoods where crime can be 
prevented through residents’ investment in the local community is increased, police activities are 
made more efficient through the reallocation of the extra police forces to neighborhoods with 
relatively low resident investments. Study 4 suggests that neighborhoods where residents’ trust in 
the police is high can draw police resources. Given the results that neighborhood social capital is 
useful in utilizing police resources, the police can aggressively give more time and attention to 
the neighborhoods where the level of residents’ social capital is low. 
Furthermore, the spread of crime prevention through social capital in large areas enables 
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the role allotment between residents and the police – i.e., residents prevent minor offense and the 
police control major incidents. If crime such as burglary in a neighboring area can be prevented 
by residents’ social capital, as suggested in the present dissertation, the police can allocate their 
forces to crime that cannot be controlled by residents’ social capital (e.g., cybercrime, “hey-it’s-
me” scam, crime syndicate, etc.). Additionally, if residents concentrate their efforts on 
conducting anticrime activities, the police can provide crime prevention coaching, 
information on criminal occurrence, and counseling. The availability of these role 
allotments can be viewed as a positive utility that is generated from crime prevention 
through neighborhood social capital. 
 
Geographic perspectives of neighborhood social capital and crime 
One of the progressive approaches of this dissertation is the introduction GIS and spatial 
analytic techniques into analyses on psychosocial factors such as trust, norms of reciprocity, and 
social participation. Characteristics of neighborhoods and neighbors have not been rigorously 
examined in the field of psychology even though social psychology stresses the importance of the 
social contexts in which people are embedded. Studies 3 and 4’s findings that the effects of social 
capital indices can vary according to geographic definitions of neighborhood illustrate the 
interaction processes between “micro” neighborhood residents that have not been captured in 
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traditional multilevel models using such geographic boundaries such as choumoku. Furthermore, 
Study 4’s suggestion that the significant geographic range of neighborhood may depend on the 
theoretical models adopted in research can provide clues about the neighborhood range and 
strategies to employ when planning community-based interventions. 
Additionally, these techniques introduce new perspectives into the theory development 
of this field. Some neighborhood factors that have been insignificant in the framework of 
commonly used multilevel models may not be unrelated to the outcomes; rather, they have been 
incorrectly examined using inappropriate neighborhood definitions. For example, if indices of the 
systemic model, which were examined in Study 4, are not significant in a multilevel analysis that 
sets street blocks as the “neighborhood level,” there is a possibility that the street block is simply 
overly small to detect the effects of the systemic model. 
Influence processes among residents cannot be ignored when studying social capital in 
terms of the resources that are embedded in the neighborhood. However, studies that focus solely 
on the macro social context cannot capture its internal dynamics. Although studies using GIS and 
spatial analyses in the field of social psychology have only recently begun (e.g., Takagi, Ikeda, & 
Kawachi, 2012), the number of studies on the relationships between social capital and crime using 
these techniques are fewer in Japan than in the Western countries. We hope that future studies that 
utilize these new techniques will be accumulated in the psychology-related fields in Japan. 
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Social consequences of rising crime and surveillance: Recommendations for social interventions 
The current dissertation also investigated how the crime rate and the exercise of social 
surveillance affect local communities. In terms of the effects of the crime rate, this dissertation 
suggests that rising crime is positively associated with the number of intimate social networks 
and, contrarily, is negatively related to the number of unfamiliar acquaintanceships – i.e., rising 
crime may fractionalize social relationships into cliques. These findings imply an important 
recommendation to future criminal policy and crime prevention. Given that cliquing social 
relationships in neighborhoods is facilitated by rising crime, we should bridge between the cliques 
in neighborhoods with high crime rates. The police and experts can serve as bridges between the 
cliques in the case that people’s social relationships are fragmented. The “Crime Reduction” 
movement (“Herasou Hanzai” Undou) in Hiroshima City and the “Convenience Police Box 
Project” in Chiba City can serve as useful references. In Hiroshima City, a chamber of town 
development was established in 2006 to unite community-based organizations. The chamber has 
successfully cohered and linked anticrime activities that were exercised by small groups, with the 
participation of the police and experts (Hiroshima city, 2006). In Chiba City, the “Convenience 
Police Box” was placed in the parking lot of a convenience store. Residents’ anticrime volunteer 
patrols have been conducted based on the Convenience Police Box, where retired policemen 
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reside (The Chiba Prefectural Police, 2014). In this project, multiple volunteer patrol groups are 
expected to be linked to each other. Thus, through the establishment of chambers and “hubs” for 
anticrime activities in neighborhoods, social mechanisms that connect individual residents to each 
other can be introduced. Situational crime prevention (Clarke, 1995), defensible space (Newman, 
1972), and Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) (Crowe, 1991), which 
have been the basis for traditional town development, have largely focused on the physical 
hardware of neighborhood environments in practice (Matsukawa et al., 2009). Compared to these 
theories, efforts to build social networks among residents or organizations have been relatively 
recently “resuscitated” with the concept of the 2nd generation of CPTED (Cozens et al., 2005; 
Reynald, 2011) in the field of crime prevention community design (in this sense, the surveillance 
camera installation project that was addressed in Study 6 can be viewed as an idea from the “1st 
generation”). The current dissertation particularly focused on the function of social capital as a 
complement to the shortcomings of physical environmental improvement plans (e.g., monetary 
cost and fortification). Although the impacts of these efforts on the neighborhood have not been 
sufficiently investigated, future studies should empirically examine the effects of such social 
mechanisms not only on crime but also on neighborhood social capital. 
One of the purposes of Study 6 was to provide evidence about the merits and demerits 
of the recent crime prevention community design (i.e., fortification and exclusionism in the 
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neighborhood). Because the effects of surveillance cameras on local communities have seldom 
been empirically examined, the results of Study 6 offer new insights into this field. This study 
suggested that the exposure to surveillance cameras had imbalanced effects in that it decreased 
residents’ evaluation of neighborhood cohesion and, contrarily, increased their trust in others. 
These results imply that surveillance society has the potential to sacrifice some positive factors 
instead of ensuring residents’ assurance and security. This study does not claim that surveillance 
should not be exercised in society; rather, it underscores the importance of balance in surveillance. 
The results of this study lend support to the necessity of the idea of “crime prevention through 
social capital” rather than the excessive progression of crime prevention community design 
including surveillance. However, research on the sole case of surveillance cameras is insufficient 
to fully explore the merits and demerits of the recent crime prevention community design 
improvements of the physical environments. Future studies should reveal the effects of the crime 
prevention community design (e.g., street lights, parks with poor visibility, mixed land 
use/building use, etc.) beyond surveillance cameras on residents’ perceptions and attitudes toward 
the neighborhood. 
Incidentally, this dissertation does not claim that interventions by public administration 
or the police are effective only for the bridging of the software aspect of the neighborhood. Rather, 
it argues that such bridging is one of the functions that public administration and the police should 
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play. If neighborhood crime prevention works smoothly due to bridges between residents, as 
previously mentioned, minor offenses can be controlled by residents’ efforts without excessive 
dependence on interventions by public administration and the police. Presumably, some 
neighborhoods need aggressive interventions from public administration and the police, who 
should actively intervene in such neighborhoods. However, one of the utilities of crime prevention 
through social capital is that it enables many neighborhoods to require fewer (if any) such 
interventions by public administration and the police. 
 
Remaining problems 
Then, does not crime prevention through social capital include the risks of social 
exclusion and elimination? The answer, unfortunately, is “yes.” For example, it is possible that 
residents who participate in collective anticrime activities alienate and exclude residents who do 
not participate in these activities. Nevertheless, the excluded residents may enjoy the benefits of 
public safety that result from the externality/spillover effect of neighborhood social capital. 
However, such a society may be far from healthy. These concerns are applicable not only to direct 
anticrime behaviors, such as collective anticrime activities (e.g., neighborhood watches), but also 
to neighborhood management activities and informal social controls (e.g., reprimanding youths 
who are idling in the neighborhood). To solve the above-mentioned problem, it is important to 
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build a mechanism that forms bridges between residents. For example, in the field of social 
psychology, some experimental studies have demonstrated that some interventions can enhance 
residents’ trust in others. Mutz (2009) used an experimental technique to show that positive 
experiences increase participants’ generalized trust. Ikeda and Richey (2011) demonstrated that 
the use of a local currency in a community can heighten residents’ trust. Given the findings of 
these previous studies, we posit that the social capital of neighborhood residents can be developed. 
As previously mentioned, relatively powerful actors, such as the police and legislative chambers, 
can undertake the key role in interventions. In addition to the residents’ grass-roots social capital, 
which was the main type that was examined in this dissertation, links in the social capital of public 
agencies, social organizations, and social institutions must be established. 
 
 Despite the remaining problems, one major practical meaning of social capital lies in 
the point that the crime prevention effect is a by-product of social capital. Namely, although many 
people do not interact with others for the purpose of crime prevention, the ties that are built for 
other purposes are beneficial for crime prevention at certain moments. From this viewpoint, for 
community crime prevention, approaches that foster the fundamental relationships demonstrated 
in this dissertation are important, regardless of the presence of physical environmental designs 
that are specialized for crime control. The introduction of “social structures” that promote 
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connections among people, such as women’s associations, child-rearing circles, and community 
festivals, is recommended for safe (not “fortified”) town development. Additionally, although this 
dissertation does not directly examine this issue, the presence of anticrime activity groups in a 
neighborhood may also yield desirable effects on mutual aid at times of disaster, child-raising and 
residents’ health.  
Second, the current dissertation suggests the “regionality” of social capital – i.e., the 
variation in the amount of social capital depends on geographical areas and the fact that 
neighborhoods have a high or low crime prevention ability from the standpoint of social capital 
(and that the difference is not dependent on administrative boundaries). Thus, the utilization of 
GIS will be substantially useful for “visualizing” neighborhood social capital. The visualization 
of the spatial distribution of social capital can facilitate cooperation between academic researchers 
and administrative officers. For example, researchers measure social capital through social 
surveys and combine the data with geographic information, and public administration can plan 
interventions for high-risk neighborhoods using this information. In contrast to physically 
fortifying vulnerable neighborhoods against crime, the facilitation of social capital in high-risk 
neighborhoods can improve various outcomes that are not limited to neighborhood safety (Putnam, 
2000). This is precisely one of the reasons that this dissertation emphasizes the by-product effects 
of social capital. While strategies that promote neighborhood social capital still need further 
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consideration, an important practical recommendation of this dissertation is that researchers 
should help public administration to detect neighborhoods that are at risk in terms of social capital. 
By doing so, we can plan to avoid the spread of the hardware aspect of anticrime measures, such 
as the installation of surveillance cameras throughout Japan, and focus on building a safe society 
without excessive surveillance. 
As described above, the current dissertation expresses many implications of social 
capital and crime. As previously mentioned, residents’ trust can be developed by building social 
mechanisms (Ikeda & Richey, 2009; Mutz, 2009). Researchers should introduce such strategies 
into local communities and investigate how they affect people’s social capital and crime. For 
example, future studies should investigate how the creation of consociations that integrate isolated 
anticrime activities and the establishment of places that can be hubs for multiple groups in 
relatively broad areas affect neighborhood crime rates and residents’ social ties. Additionally, 
although this dissertation examined respondents’ experience of actual crime victimization as an 
outcome, the effects of social capital on people’s perception of public safety should also be 
investigated. Perceived public safety is an important index that is associated with people’s 
enjoyment of life in good mental health (Chandola, 2001; Green, Gilbertson, & Grimsley, 2002; 
Stafford, Chandola, & Marmot, 2007). In addition to the prevention of actual crime, models that 
are relevant to the reduction of fear through social capital should be proposed. Furthermore, time-
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oriented sustainability and variability of crime prevention through social capital should be 
examined. Because neighborhood residents are replaced due to various reasons, especially in 
urban areas, neighborhood-level social capital and the crime prevention effects of social capital 
are expected to change over time. To explore the time-oriented changes, time-series analyses such 
as cox regression models and latent curve models using longitudinal data are preferable. If the 
effects of social capital on crime vary over time, a new challenge to devise a method with 
temporally stable crime prevention effects on the neighborhood will arise. 
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